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ABSTRACT 
Every emergency situation presents unique challenges. It is absolutely essential to have a 
good grasp on the specific situation to be able to make the best decisions possible for 
public health response and mitigation. Clear situational awareness can mean the 
difference between life and death, which allows all partners to collect information, 
collaborate, and communicate prior to making critical decisions during an emergency and 
applies to all stakeholders, whether at the state, regional, or local levels. Ultimately, the 
communication between those who have information and those who need the information 
must be shared; to be most effective, the information must be timely, accurate and 
credible.  
This thesis describes the development of a strategic communications model for 
Emergency Support Function-8 (ESF-8) public health and medical partners from the state 
to comprehensive grassroots level in Mississippi (MS). The development of the MS ESF-
8 Healthcare Coalition (MEHC) single model allows for information sharing across the 
entire medical enterprise in MS, including both public and private entities. Through case 
studies, events, an exercise, and workshops, the MEHC model was developed and a 
common operating picture was realized. This thesis filled a needed gap and will 
ultimately help to save lives.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
How can Mississippi make its Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8)-based strategic 
communications plan more effective and resilient so that it provides accurate, 
comprehensive, and timely information to peripheral actors in the state’s healthcare 
community? 
Every emergency situation presents unique challenges. Therefore, it is absolutely 
essential to have a good grasp on the specific situation to be able to make the best 
decisions possible for response and mitigation. Clear situational awareness can even 
mean the difference in life and death. Thus, situational awareness will allow all partners 
to collect information, collaborate, and communicate prior to making these critical 
decisions during an emergency event and applies to all stakeholders, whether at the state, 
regional, or local levels. Ultimately, the communication between those who have 
information and those who need the information must be shared timely, with accuracy 
and credibility of the information playing a key role in the effectiveness of its use.  
DEVELOPING A MODEL 
This thesis reviews the model development of ESF-8 public health and medical 
partners from the state level to the comprehensive grassroots level in Mississippi (MS). 
The development of the Mississippi ESF-8 Healthcare Coalition (MEHC) single model 
allows for information sharing within the entire medical enterprise in MS, including both 
public and private entities. Through case studies, events, an exercise, and workshops, the 
MEHC model was developed and a common operating picture was realized.  
As the leads for ESF-8 in Mississippi (MS), the MS State Department of Health 
(MSDH), along with the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC), have a great 
responsibility to the ESF-8 partners in MS to provide event situational awareness to all 
stakeholders. Understanding that all events are local, in order for key decisions to be 
made appropriately, the latest information is needed by the comprehensive partnership of 
the local public health and medical stakeholders. Also, it is just as important that the state 
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level partners have the information from the locals to make key decisions overall for the 
healthcare of the state. 
NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 
During the spring of 2011, the MSDH was poised to respond to the flooding of 
the MS River along the western border of the state. If the levees were breeched, 14 
counties could potentially see widespread flooding. The governor of MS asked what the 
medical picture of the state would look like if massive flooding occurred in all counties. 
It became apparent that, while clear conduits to reach the larger medical community, such 
as hospitals, were available, a current means to reach the comprehensive public health 
and medical community readily to compile the big picture for the entire state was not. 
Immediate work was started to determine what the comprehensive picture would look 
like, and from this event, arose a validation of a need for a comprehensive ESF-8 public 
health and medical strategic communication model.  
STATEWIDE PARTNERS NEEDED 
Who should be considered partners in ESF-8 in Mississippi? According to the 
Mississippi governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP), ESF-8 is 
the emergency support function for public health and medical services. It provides the 
mechanism for coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, tribal, and local 
resources in response to a public health and medical disaster, potential or actual incidents 
requiring a coordinated federal response, and/or during a developing potential health and 
medical emergency. Within this ESF-8 plan, a defined list of potential ESF-8 players 
includes more than just hospitals and emergency medical systems (EMSs). Some 
examples of other potential partners include dialysis specialists, pharmacists, dentists, and 
the military. It is unclear however, for example, whether dialysis clinics can receive 
information from public health agencies during a crisis. Moreover, if they cannot receive  
accurate, timely, and useful information, they may be at risk of being unable to provide 
their patients with the proper treatments or could even risk transmitting disease, and thus, 
become a part of the disease vector. 
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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS MODEL NEEDED 
Although multiple partners are listed in the CEMP, clear communication pathways 
are lacking that allow critical public health and medical information to be provided to the 
comprehensive public health and medical community. To ensure a comprehensive ESF-8 
state level healthcare coalition exists, a defined group of partners is needed that is larger 
than a traditional hospital and an EMS. Each group represented needs to understand what 
it can bring to the table for emergency planning and response to respond better as a state 
during an emergency. Through the research and model development, MS will make its 
ESF-8 based strategic communications plan more effective and resilient so that it provides 
accurate, comprehensive, and timely information to peripheral actors in the state’s 
healthcare community. 
This thesis developed a communication model currently being implemented in 
Mississippi.  
All signs seem to indicate that a marked improvement in the strategic 
communication will occur within the comprehensive ESF-8 community of the state. More 
ESF-8 partners and their supporting partnerships of ESF-8 from other emergency support 
function areas are taking their seat at the table more than ever have before. As a result, it 
is felt that the outcomes to healthcare during any emergency event will be improved and 
the informed decisions that the ESF-8 community can make with ESF-8 situational 
awareness will ultimately improve health and save lives.  
Value Proposition—Many will ask what the value is of a comprehensive ESF-8 
state to grassroots communications model. It can then be determined within the current 
information sharing structure of ESF-8 what needs to be eliminated, reduced, raised, and 
created as follows. 
 Eliminate 
 Gaps in communication for collaborative ESF-8 partnership 
 Multiple models and lists of ESF-8 partners 
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 Raise 
 Value of information shared in terms of usefulness, accuracy, 
timeliness 
 Reduce 
 Risk of miscommunication  
 Lack of communication 
 Inability to contact all ESF-8 partnership 
 Create 
 Timeliness of information 
 Transparency of information 
 Accuracy of information 
 Trust of ESF-8 leadership 
The combination of these changes creates the innovation pathways of 
communication. The following list includes the dimensions of these pathways: 
organizational, human, technical, and political, etc. With the creation of the timeliness of 
information, the transparency of information, and the accuracy of information, it will be a 
natural result to increase the trust of ESF-8 leadership. These four created outcomes will 
increase the value of the coordination of communication within the MS ESF-8 network.  
While value might be thought of in terms of dollars used and saved, value is also 
measured by the overall impact something has on current policy. The state of Mississippi 
has 1% of the total population of the United States of America. Therefore, it receives 
approximately 1% of the total award of the PHEP/HPP grant dollars. As the economic 
crisis in this country continues to drive a decrease in funding for grant opportunities, it 
remains critical to ensure that the value of this communication modeling strategy is cost 
benefit effective.  
 
Value can also be related to increased performance. In the response phase of a 
disaster, the timeliness of information can mean the difference in life and death. This 
system is expected to provide factual information, consistently, in a timely fashion, and 
correctly, so that decisions can be made that may ultimately prevent morbidity and 
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mortality whether associated with a disease outbreak or incident of man-made cause. This 
transparency will also automatically lead to greater trust of leadership, which helps to 
drive more positive opportunity for refinement of planning and response processes. 
Ultimately, the value is a more prepared comprehensive medical community.  
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If you want to go quickly, go alone. 
If you want to go far, go together. 
—African proverb 
A. BACKGROUND 
Every emergency situation presents unique challenges. Therefore, it is absolutely 
essential to have a good grasp on the specific situation to be able to make the best 
decisions possible for response and mitigation. Clear situational awareness can even 
mean the difference in life and death, especially in the medical community. Ultimately, 
the communication between those who have information and those who need the 
information must be shared in a timely fashion. Accuracy and credibility of the 
information will also play a key role in the effectiveness of its use.  
As the leads for Emergency Support Function-8 (ESF-8) in Mississippi (MS), the 
MS State Department of Health (MSDH), along with the University of MS Medical 
Center (UMMC), have a great responsibility to the ESF-8 partners in MS to provide 
event situational awareness to all stakeholders. Understanding that all events are local, in 
key decisions to be made appropriately, the latest information is needed by the 
comprehensive partnership of the local public health and medical stakeholders. Also, it is 
just as important that the state level partners have the information from the locals to make 
key decisions overall for the healthcare of the state. Situational awareness will allow all 
players and partners to collect information, collaborate, and communicate prior to making 
these critical decisions during emergency events. In order to have clear situational 
awareness, strategic communications from the state level to the grassroots level must 
occur in a timely fashion. How can the accurate relay of information occur in a timely 
manner by a trusted source? What would an ESF-8 strategic communication model look 
like from the state level to the grassroots level? How would strategic information be 




To have a better understanding of what these answers might look like, from the 
lenses of the local and the state players, it is useful to consider a scenario from each lens. 
An impending hurricane is about to hit the coast of Mississippi. Why does a local 
pharmacist in the northern part of the state need to know what is happening to pharmacies 
along the coastline and other parts of the state? As citizens shift during evacuations, their 
healthcare and pharmaceutical needs could also shift with them. In addition, if citizens 
stay in the coastal area, but pharmacies are not operational, the supply chain could be 
affected and the need for pharmaceuticals could possibly be met by other pharmacies in 
other parts of the state. Why would the state level partners need to know what is 
happening in a private business, such as a pharmacy? The state level could be the 
coordinator of information to provide overall situational awareness to further coordinate 
the public health and medical needs of the citizens of the state.  
Currently, multiple communication models and databases affect the public health 
and medical community and allow for information sharing and strategic communication 
during an emergency response. The Health Alert Network is communication tool utilized 
at the federal and state level to distribute critical emergency medical information. In MS, 
it is a means to communicate public health crisis information to the public health and 
medical community but is not necessarily used for every emergency response to share 
situational awareness. This voluntary database has been most useful to inform the 
medical stakeholders of crisis information related to disease outbreaks and the like. 
Another database is the volunteer databases for medical and non-medical personnel in all 
states. For Mississippi, the Volunteers in Preparedness Registry (VIPR) is a volunteer 
database used to inform potential healthcare responders of information related to 
trainings, activations, etc. Additionally, the MS public health districts have ESF-8 
databases of contacts that have been built over the years from relationship development 
in their specific regions. None of these volunteer databases is comprehensive in nature. 
The State Medical Asset Resource Tracking Tool (SMARTT) is a communication tool 
utilized with the MS hospitals and a few other medical entities to collect “hav-bed” (the 
number of available beds) and clinician availability information daily. While this system 
is required within the hospital realm, it is not comprehensive to all other medical 
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institutions. Ultimately, no one model reaches that comprehensive public health and 
medical community to share accurate and timely information during an event. In 
Mississippi, the leadership has established that it is important for all partners to have 
situational awareness so that potential life-saving decisions can be based upon current 
and accurate information. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can Mississippi make its ESF-8-based strategic communications plan more 
effective and resilient so that it provides accurate, comprehensive, and timely information 
to peripheral actors in the state’s healthcare community? 
C. PROBLEM  
Public health has a very important role to play in homeland security. Within the 
Department of Homeland Security, it is even considered a level three tiered critical 
infrastructure component of the United States.1 The problem is that no strategic 
communication plan exists in Mississippi for the comprehensive healthcare community 
(from the local pharmacists to large hospitals) to receive ESF-8 related and other types of 
communication from state public health authorities. Conversely, the state public health 
authorities do not have a clear strategy for obtaining information from the grassroots 
level in a timely manner. The Mississippi River Flood Event of 2011 validated this claim 
that state health authorities had limited access to the larger health and medical 
community. 
During the spring of 2011, the MSDH was poised to respond to the flooding of 
the Mississippi River along the western border of the state. If the levees were breeched, 
14 counties could potentially see widespread flooding. The governor of Mississippi 
requested to know what the medical picture of the state would look like if massive 
flooding occurred in all counties. It became apparent that while clear conduits were 
available to reach the larger medical community, such as hospitals, a current means to 
                                                 




reach the comprehensive public health and medical community readily to determine that 
message for the governor was not. Immediate work was started to determine what the 
comprehensive picture would look like, and from this event, arose a validation of a need 
for a comprehensive ESF-8 public health and medical strategic communication model.  
Who should be considered partners in ESF-8 in Mississippi? According to the 
Mississippi Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP), ESF-8 is 
the emergency support function for public health and medical services. It provides the 
mechanism for coordinated federal assistance to supplement state, tribal, and local 
resources in response to a public health and medical disaster, potential or actual incidents 
requiring a coordinated federal response, and/or during a developing potential health and 
medical emergency. Within this ESF-8 plan, a defined list of potential ESF-8 players 
includes more than just hospitals and emergency medical systems (EMSs). Some 
examples of other potential partners include dialysis specialists, pharmacists, dentists, and 
the military. It is unclear however, for example, whether dialysis clinics can receive 
information from public health agencies during a crisis. Moreover, if they cannot receive 
accurate, timely, and useful information, they may be at risk of being unable to provide 
their patients with the proper treatments or could even risk transmitting disease, and thus, 
become a part of the disease vector. 
Although multiple partners are listed in the CEMP, clear communication pathways 
are lacking that allow critical public health and medical information to be provided to the 
comprehensive public health and medical community. To ensure that a comprehensive 
ESF-8 state level healthcare coalition exists, there a defined group of partners is needed 
that is larger than a traditional hospital and an EMS. Each group represented needs to 
understand what it can bring to the table for emergency planning and response to respond 
better as a state during an emergency. Federal guidance and planning recommends 
healthcare coalitions as a means of support and resource allocation during disasters. 
Before a comprehensive strategic communications plan can be better defined, the “what,” 
“who” and “why” must be determined. 
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1. Local Conduits for ESF-8 
Mississippi, like most other states, has an emergency manager at the county level 
in all of its 82 counties. This county structure mimics the state structure with 16 different 
ESFs to include ESF-8 as the public health and medical group.2 The MSDH has regional 
teams of emergency preparedness personnel in all its nine public health regions that are 
the conduit to the county ESF-8 partners. (See Figure 1-MS Public Health Regions) 
These nine healthcare coalitions are primary to the overall emergency planning and 
response efforts in the state of Mississippi. The regions continue to build the relationships 
to support a comprehensive ESF-8 healthcare coalition and ESF-8 databases are 
continually evolving. Often times, an organization, such as the MS Board of Medical 
Licensure, will have a comprehensive list of medical physicians to which local or 
regional emergency preparedness teams do not have access. This state level organization 
can then be a conduit to information sharing during a disaster event. 
                                                 
2 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Mississippi Emergency Support Function #8—Public 





Figure 1.  MS Public Health Districts3 
                                                 




2. Why Is Communication Important? 
Communication has always been the primary issue that precludes an organized 
and smart practices response. Multiple after action reports (AARs) list communication as 
the first capability of a corrective action plan (CAP) to garner the most impact for a more 
improved response. As hard as responders try to close this gap, “there continues to be a 
reflection of a needed and necessary improvement where communication is concerned.”4 
As was learned during the Mississippi River Flood Event of 2011, to communicate up 
from the grassroots level to the governor effectively, a clear communication pathway is 
needed. Likewise, as those pathways were determined, the return of information could 
more readily flow from the governor down to the grassroots level in the form of daily 
situational awareness reports. A comprehensive state-wide healthcare communication 
strategy needs to be able to address such issues as the current situational status of varied 
entities to include factors, such as power outages, operational state of facility, and any 
access to care issues. 
3. What Does “Comprehensive ESF-8” Mean? 
A comprehensive ESF-8 group would reflect an entire representation of the 
potential primary and support entities of the public health and medical community 
whether at the local, regional, or state level. It is natural to think about hospitals and long-
term care facilities when thinking about ESF-8. Multiple other partners are often 
overlooked in the ESF-8 picture, such as pharmacists, dentists, doctors, nurses, 
veterinarians, morticians, mental health providers, dialysis partners, and so forth. These 
groups have a piece to the puzzle that will complete the ESF-8 picture. During the 
Mississippi River Flood event of 2011, the comprehensive ESF-8 picture included any 
potential medical person or clinic, as well as anyone affiliated with a support role under 
the MS CEMP ESF-8 support role plan.5 
                                                 
4 Jim Craig, MS State Department of Health, Director of Health Protection, May 2011. 
5 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Mississippi Emergency Support Function #8—Public 
Health and Medical Services Annex.” 
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4. Potential Consequence 
Lack of a strategic communication plan or model in Mississippi for the 
comprehensive healthcare community (from the local pharmacists to large hospitals) is 
potentially preventing the entire healthcare picture from being drawn upon in an 
emergency event. This potential consequence could ultimately cost the lives of 
Mississippians during the perfect storm or it could be improved with the development of 
a comprehensive strategic communication model. 
D. METHOD 
How can Mississippi make its ESF-8 based strategic communications plan more 
effective and resilient so that it provides accurate, comprehensive, and timely information 
to more peripheral actors in the state’s healthcare community? To answer this question, 
multiple analysis steps were used for this thesis.  
As the Chief Nurse of the Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response, the 
author has had the opportunity to work very closely with this project in the development 
and implementation stages, as well as do the research associated with this thesis. 
The literature review was used to determine the current strategic communication 
models that might be available in the United States, as well as in other countries. It was 
also used to determine smart practices associated with strategic communication in various 
professions. Ultimately, the literature review provides the baseline of current information 
available related to the topics that can help answer the ESF-8 strategic communication 
question for Mississippi.  
In Chapter III, the author researched and reported on a study of the healthcare 
communication lessons learned from the SARS outbreak of 2003. While many negative 
communication lessons were learned from China, Singapore communicated with its 
healthcare community in a very different manner with some positive outcomes. The 
negative implications that centered on China and the universal disease outbreak during 
which healthcare communication strategies were not successfully utilized provide lessons 
that can be applied when developing healthcare communication models.  
 9 
 
Chapter IV provides a case study of three different areas as they relate to 
coordination of strategic communication. Fire and law enforcement were chosen due to 
their historical progression of their coordination of communication strategies within each 
of their own disciplines. Since they have existed for years in the United States, have 
formalized practices and models, and traditionally reach to the grassroots level across the 
country, it was felt that these groups were worth researching for an ESF-8 model. 
By evaluating lessons already learned within Mississippi and the country at large, 
answers to the research question can begin to be formulated. Chapter V centers on a real-
world event, a full scale exercise, and a national workshop. It was during the Hattiesburg 
Tornado of January 2013 that the MSDH continued to refine the strategic communication 
process. During the full-scale exercise the following month, MSDH conducted a two-
question survey to determine the effectiveness and use of the ESF-8 strategic 
communication process during the Hattiesburg Tornado. Several months later, a 
workshop was held at the Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, GA in 
June 2013 that addressed discussions centering on methods of quick communication for 
contact availability to medical partners These findings guided the next chapter. 
To build a model for Mississippi that includes the comprehensive public health 
and medical community, the MS strategic communication partners must be defined. 
Information gathered by MSDH from a December 5, 2012 meeting of the Mississippi 
ESF-8 Healthcare Coalition (MEHC) partnership was reviewed and analyzed to 
determine who should be a member of the MEHC Communication model. MSDH 
sponsored this meeting and convened to bring the representation of each of these affected 
entities together to discuss the formalization of a state-level healthcare coalition. During 
this meeting, two primary activities occurred that were used for the purposes of this thesis. 
 A four-question survey was issued to determine if a need existed for 
formalization and communication strategies. 
 A discussion was held by the at-large body to determine if any potential 




This chapter culminates with a table of current and potential partners. While some 
partners are included because of the general resources that they can provide to the overall 
public health and medical community, many were identified because of their general 
vulnerabilities.  
Chapter VII is the actual model development for the state of Mississippi. This 
development is a culmination of work from the previous chapters. It reflects a state to 
grassroots level ESF-8 strategic communications pathway that can be used for 
information gathering and sharing in a timely manner.  
The final results of this thesis provide a model that reflects the communication 
pathways from the governor of Mississippi to state public health, and then finally, to the 
grassroots level of medical partners. The intended reader will be able to use this thesis to 
apply the same model for a strategic communications model from state public health to 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Information is a source of learning. But unless it is organized, processed, 
and available to the right people in a format for decision making, it is a 
burden, not a benefit.”6 
—C. William Pollard, 
former CEO of The ServiceMaster Co. 
A. LITERATURE SORTING 
Much attention has been given to the value of communication in general 
emergency preparedness and response over the years. While the literature does not 
indicate a current comprehensive ESF-8 state to grassroots level strategic communication 
model, several topic areas in the literature could assist in the development of such a 
model. A broad sweep of the literature was done, and then to narrow the literature, it was 
determined to focus primarily on the various areas as they related to health and 
healthcare. Also, while the research dated after January 1, 2007, narrowed the amount of 
information, it also added a more relevant context to the vision and knowledge of a MS 
strategic communication plan for the ESF-8 community. This date was chosen randomly 
but would then give an approximate six-year range of literature. With this more narrowed 
literature review focus, a picture of the current state of knowledge and the 
accomplishments of strategic communication to healthcare was determined. Thus, an 
advancement of the vision and knowledge of what would and would not work as a 
communication strategy was determined.  
To gain knowledge regarding the topic of healthcare strategic communication 
organization, several different topic areas were researched. The topic areas are strategic 
communication, interagency coordination and communication, healthcare coalitions, 
strategic communication systems, and meta-leadership. These areas were researched with 
a vision of the chapter layouts of the thesis. First, strategic communication and its 
systems were explored through case studies surrounding fire and law enforcement at the 
                                                 




local and rural levels. Second, the literature included a study of lessons learned from 
SARS regarding interagency coordination and communication that provided much useful 
information. Interagency coordination was also further explored through a study of 
current exercises and real-life events. While a review of the literature found healthcare 
coalitions to be a topic of interest to the current public health emergency preparedness 
time frame, it was also an area that reflected very current research information. The final 
topic of research interest was meta-leadership. Although very limited information was 
available, the research found this concept to be notable as a growing trend to support the 
model being developed. The issues surrounding strategic communication and information 
sharing within the ESF-8 community and beyond have cascading implications that could 
compromise the general healthcare for the citizens of Mississippi. Therefore, this 
literature review explores five aspects of this complex matter: (1) strategic 
communications, (2) interagency coordination and communication, (3) healthcare 
coalitions, (4) strategic communication systems, and (5) meta-leadership. 
B. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION/S 
The researched literature for strategic communication comes from multiple 
sources, such as journals, military studies, scholarly papers, theses, government 
emergency preparedness plans, and other academic papers. Policy and strategy 
documents were also beneficial to the research process. To narrow the frame of 
anticipated literature reviewed, a general definition of strategic communication was 
obtained.7 Christopher Paul’s journal article says “the Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms states that strategic communication consists of 
“focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to 




                                                 




Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, 
plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of 
national power.”8 
Although minimal information is available on “healthcare” strategic 
communications, research reflects that much is written about military, business, fire, and 
law enforcement throughout the years. Two specific military articles related to strategic 
communications center on an issue known as the U.S. Africa Command and its area of 
responsibility. The referenced U.S. Africa Command is a diverse, complex, and large 
area of responsibility. It includes 53 African states, over 800 ethnic groups with more 
than 1,000 languages. The U.S. Africa Command has a responsibility to the security of 
this geographical entity. Strategic communications were utilized to get a controversial 
issue moving forward in a cohesive manner. In 2012, Charles W. Hooper wrote that by 
building partnerships, the partners should be able to share in the responsibilities and costs 
of events.9 In the previous year, Ward’s article noted that their primary approach is to 
emphasize a simple set of messages and then to apply them consistently.10 Although they 
were different in their intended messages, both articles address the value of strategic 
communication and interagency collaboration. 
Additionally, the website of Boston Sparks Association is useful to show how 
strategic communication is actually initiated through the fire service as far back 1678.11 
An article by Kristy Annely is instrumental in the historical markers of the law 
enforcement strategic communication.12 Also, a law enforcement website provides  
 
                                                 
8 Paul, “Strategic Communication Is Vague, Say What You Mean,” 10–14. 
9 Charles W. “Hooper, “Going Farther by Going Together,” JFQ 67 (4th quarter, October 2012): 8–13, 
https://www.nwpublichealth.org/archives/s2013/northwest-public-health-spring-summer-2013. 
10 General William E. “Kip Ward, “Strategic Communication At Work,” Leader to Leader 2011, no. 
59 (Winter 2011): 33–38. 
11 Boston Sparks Association, “A Brief History of the Boston Fire Department,” Boston Fire Museum, 
(n.d.), http://www.bostonfiremuseum.com/history_bfd.html. 




several useful articles. Eddie Reyes’ writings on the website www.policeone.com helps to 
validate a need for streamlining information and using common language, providing 
correct information fast, as well as justifying a public health model through his writings 
pertaining to challenges and changes in communication over the last decade.13,14,15 
While much is to be gained from these documents, one of the more useful documents is 
the Chickasaw County MS History of the Fire Service and the Chickasaw County Law 
Enforcement Strategic Communication Plan.16 They are rich in information of how a 
rural area actively engages in strategic communication and how the planning has evolved 
over the years. Another useful source is the California Public Safety Communications 
Strategic Plan.17 Its relevance to urban strategic communication (as well as interagency 
coordination) further expands the vision for a public health model. This urban strategic 
plan is beneficial as it shows how it has rallied multiple agencies for strategic 
communication efforts. Together, all the documents related to the fire and law 
enforcement strategic communication strategies describe the historical significance of 
strategic communication and how it has changed over the years. They also help to 
validate why a public health strategic communication model is needed and how it can be 
developed by sharing what has worked and what has not to accomplish their mission. 
The literature review on strategic communication leads to several government 
websites and communication plans. The most useful site for the development of a MS 
                                                 
13 Eddie Reyes, “A Decade of Challenges and Changes in Communications,” PoliceOne.Com, 
December 8, 2009, http://www.policeone.com/police-products/communications/articles/1974739-A-
decade-of-challenges-and-changes-in-communications/. 
14 Eddie Reyes, “Keeping Critical Police Communication Fast, Clear & Protected,” PoliceOne.Com, 
August 21, 2006. 
15 Eddie Reyes, “Common Language Is the Key to Achieving Better Interoperability,” 
PoliceOne.Com, May 26, 2006, http://www.policeone.com/police-products/communications/articles/ 
134505-Common-language-is-the-key-to-achieving-better-interoperability/. 
16 Robert Lamar Goza, History of Houston, MS Fire Service, June 5, 2013. 
17 Corey McKenna, “California Releases Public Safety Communications Strategic Plan,” Emergency 




model is the MS Emergency Management Agency and the MS ESF-8 plan.18 This plan 
identifies the various partners to the ESF-8 collaboration but does not identify a strategic 
communication model. A broad sweep of various other state ESF-8 plans fails to produce 
a strategic communication model also.  
A medical article by Darsey, Carlton, and Wilson also provides pertinent 
information concerning the validation for the development of an ESF-8 strategic 
communication model for Mississippi.19 The article was written following Hurricane 
Katrina by a group of MS healthcare practitioners, and thus, confirmed the need for a MS 
comprehensive ESF-8 strategic communication model. An AAR from the Public Health 
Colloquium Conference Report from March 2010 further documents the need to “develop 
a clear communication channel with feedback loops to and from federal, state, and local 
entities.” Other recommendations within this same piece of literature confirm the need 
for the model that this thesis outcome will provide.20 Very similar to the vision for this 
thesis, the literature produces an article by Mark Grube that states strategic 
communication is deemed one of the five most important strategies to enhance revenue in 
general in the healthcare setting, which then also supports the overall vision for an 
information-sharing model.21  
In addition to a public health emergency response, other areas of healthcare are 
supported in the literature review for this topic. The tobacco industry has utilized 
strategic communication to create an impact of change across this country as has other 
                                                 
18 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, “Mississippi Emergency Support Function #8—
Public Health and Medical Services Annex.” 
19 Damon Darsey, Frederick B. Carlton and Jonathan Wilson, “The Mississippi Katrina Experience: 
Applying Lessons Learned to Augment Daily Operations in Disaster Preparation and Management,” 
Southern Medical Journal 106, no. 1 (January 2013): 109–112. 
20 Yale New Haven Health Center for Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Response, Public Health 
Colloquium Discussion-Based Exercise After Action Report (The Center for Homeland Security, University 
of Colorado at Colorado Springs, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, July 2010).  
21 Mark E. Grube, “Growing the Top Line, 5 Strategies to Expand Your Business,” Healthcare 
Financial Management 61, no. 5 (May 2007): 57–68.  
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groups, such as QuadraMed.22,23 QuadraMed is a leading provider of healthcare services 
and software that improve the quality, safety, and efficiency of patient care. Finally, an 
article found in the literature review written by Arnesen, Cid, Scott, Perez, and Zervaas 
reinforces that strategic communication is instrumental in the rebuilding of the Central 
American Network for Disaster and Health Information.24 While the literature review 
pertaining to strategic communication is varied, the overall literature review is absent of a 
current public health/medical model for strategic communication pathways.  
C. INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 
A March 2007 thesis by Joseph P. McGeary describes the conflict of departments 
between fire and police, and utilized the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 as a framework 
for correcting the problems.25 By utilizing the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, the 
culture was changed that allowed jointness versus individual platforms. In bringing 
together a comprehensive healthcare coalition of public and private partners, the 
recommended changes are likely to bring about hesitancy and turf protection. The 
McGeary thesis outlines the interagency situation and provides answers relevant across 
various domains. 
The literature review reveals several other sources relevant to this topic and thesis 
vision. First, some government websites describe current grants, capabilities, exercise 
guidelines, historical data related to emergency responses, and the amount of money 
spent on emergency preparedness and communication. The Health and Human Services, 
Homeland Security, and Center for Disease Control and Prevention websites provide 
                                                 
22 Dodge Communications, “QuadraMed and Decision Simulation Partner with Dodge 
Communications for Integrated Communications and Public Relations,” Business Wire (English) (2011). 
23 James F. Thrasher and Lourdes Reynales-Shigematsu, “Promoting the Effective Translation of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control; A Case Study of Challenges and Opportunities for Strategic 
Communication,” Evaluation & the Health Professions 31, no. 2 (April 4, 2008): 145. 
24 Stacey J. Arnesen et al., “The Central American Network for Disaster and Health Information,” 
Journal of the Medical Library Association 95, no. 3 (July 2007): 316–322. 
25 Joseph P. McGeary, “Applying Goldwater-Nichols Reforms to Foster Interagency Cooperation 




current and historical data related to emergency preparedness and response for all these 
areas.26,27,28 The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program website 
describes the current guidelines for exercises.29 The MS Strategic National Stockpile 
plan, MSDH Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) Plan, and other emergency plans are 
located on the MSDH website.30  
The expanded literature review of this topic provides information as current as the 
recent Boston Marathon response. Two articles validate the value of interagency 
coordination and communication in the response to the Boston Marathon bombing and 
the success of the response within the healthcare community. The Walls and Zinner 
article, and the Keliermann and Peleg articles, are both current literature and further 
validate good outcomes from strategic communication and interagency coordination.31,32 
Both these articles give clarity to the mission of the thesis topic by enhancing the 
direction of the ESF-8 strategic communication. As such, timely response, current 
information, and interagency collaboration are all factors that helped to save lives 
following the Boston bombings and will in other events as well.  
In addition, a GAO report, DoD Strategic Communication: Integrating Foreign 
Audience Perceptions into Policy Making, Plans, and Operations is useful as it shows the 
                                                 
26 Department of Homeland Security,” “Healthcare and Public Health Sector, Sector Overview.”  
27 Health and Human Services, “HHS Provides More than $1 Billion to Improve all Hazards Public 
Health,” June 3, 2008, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2008pres/06/20080603a.html. 
28 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response,” 
(n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/archive.htm. 
29 Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program, 
“Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) 2013,” (n.d.), https://www.llis. 
dhs.gov/hseep. 
30 Mississippi State Department of Health Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response, The MS 
State Department of Health Plan for Receiving, Distribution, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile 
Assets (Jackson, MS: Mississippi State Department of Health Office of Emergency Preparedness and 
Response, December 20, 2012). 
31 Ron M. Walls and Michael J. Zinner, “The Boston Marathon Response, Why Did It Work So 
Well?” The Journal of the American Medical Association 309, no. 23 (April 30, 2013): 2441–2442, 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleID=1684255. 
32 Arthur L. Keliermann and Kobi Peleg, “Lessons from Boston,” The New England Journal of 
Medicine 368, no. 21 (May 23, 2013): 1956–1957. 
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need to integrate strategic communication into the policy making, planning and 
operational concepts. This military report helps validate the need for public health to not 
only have a strategic communication model, but also to further integrate it into the 
policies of the agency. It also further validates the integration of other partners into the 
strategic communication processes.33 Additional literature reflects the importance of 
public health inclusion at the emergency preparedness table.34 Finally, an expanded 
literature review finds the interagency coordination lessons learned from the fire service 
to validate strategic communication and the need for clear models.35 Joseph Straw’s 
article provides a justification for the projected model development as a means to save 
lives and is useful to show how a clear strategic communication model can save lives, 
which is the end result of a public health and medical strategic communication model.  
D. HEALTHCARE COALITIONS 
The literature search on healthcare coalitions resulted in a thesis, several articles, 
and an AAR. The June 2012 thesis by Jill McElwee compares different healthcare 
coalitions from various parts of the country and with various means of financial 
support.36 This comparison is useful to show the various agencies and organizations 
within a healthcare coalition and how they communicate. Two articles pertain to the 
individual healthcare units of the Veteran’s Affairs, and the Community Health Centers, 
and how they contribute to emergency planning and response in this country. The VA 
article highlights the value of identifying new partners while continuing to strengthen the 
existing partnerships, which is a key component of this thesis vision.37 While the 
                                                 
33 U.S. Government Accountability Office, DoD Strategic Communication: Integrating Foreign 
Audience Perceptions into Policy Making, Plans, and Operations (2012). 
34 Center for Homeland Defense and Security, The CHDS Advantage: A Decade of Innovation and 
Homeland Security Education (Monterey, CA: Center For Homeland Defense and Security, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2012). 
35 Joseph Straw, “Communicating to Save Lives,” Security Management 53, no. 5 (May 2009): 62–69. 
36 Jill McElwee, “Taking a Regional Healthcare Coalition Approach to Mitigating Surge Capacity 
Needs of Mass Casualty or Pandemic Events” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2012), 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7383. 
37 Committe on Veteran’s Affairs, Emergency Preparedness: Evaluating The U.S. Department of 
Veteran’s Affairs’ Fourth Mission, Hearing (Washington, DC: U.S. Government, 2010). 
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Community Health Center article has a strong emphasis on the care of vulnerable 
populations, it is still useful to show how they fit at the table of ESF-8 and their need for 
information from leaders pertaining to an event.38 Again, in relation to the development 
of a MS model, the most useful source for this topic area is the AAR from the MS 2011 
Tornado-Flood event. It reflects the need for the formalization of the healthcare coalition 
for state-level agencies and organizations, which further validates the idea of developing 
an ESF-8 strategic communication model.39 Another useful article was written by 
Claudia Parvanta, which had a chart of “benefits and barriers of health communication 
coalitions.”40 Even though it is an older document, it provides a guide for practitioners to 
show how to communicate public health information effectively, which is useful to the 
development of the ESF-8 model.  
The expanded literature review finds this area to be on the horizon for 
development with very current information. Just as some of the other areas within this 
literature review noted a commonality with the importance of collaboration and 
communication, this particular area does the same with three specific articles. Barr’s 
article highlights the value of coming together as groups.41 Politi and Street’s article 
addresses decision making as a group.42 Then, Kapucu and Garayev’s article further 
emphasizes the value of collaborative decision making during a disaster.43 Due to the 
push by the federal government to encourage states and locals to develop healthcare 
                                                 
38 Karen M. Wood, “Community Health Centers: The Untapped Resource for Public Health and 
Mideical Preparedness,” Homeland Security Affairs 5 no. 1 (2009): 1–39, http://www.hsaj.org/?article 
=5.1.8. 
39 Mississippi State Department of Health, MSDH April–May 2011 Tornado-Flood Response AAR, 
After Action Report, Jackson, MS, 2011, 28. 
40 Claudia Parvanta, A Public Health Communication Planning Framework (Atlanta, GA: Centers for 
Disease Control, 1993). 
41 Paul Barr, “Coming Together: Coalition Offers Cooperative Approach to Disasters,” Modern 
Healthcare, November 5, 2012, 14. 
42 Mary C. Politi and Richard L. Street, “The Importance of Communication in Collaborative Decision 
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43 Naim Kapucu and Vener Garayev, “Collaborative Decision-Making in Emergency and Disaster 




coalitions,44 the literature contains a useful document from the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC). The hospital preparedness program grant guidance 
provides information pertaining to healthcare coalitions and its relativity to the overall 
model development’s mission.45 Another commonality is the value of information 
sharing and scarce resource allocation that healthcare coalitions can provide. Currie’s 
article, as well as Barr’s, highlights how coalitions can assist in strengthening the 
workforce during a disaster by working together.46,47  
E. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
By adding the term “systems” to strategic communication, the literature review 
reflects several more good theses. The common link between the theses is the systematic 
approach to different issues. As a focus on strategic communications within healthcare 
and the organization of healthcare systems, these are very beneficial. First, the December 
2008 thesis by Christopher Voss outlines the processes for connecting the crisis 
information management systems of this nation.48 Second, the September 2006 thesis by 
Maria Doris Alvarez reviews and analyzes the communications of Emergency 
Preparedness and Response Systems in New Jersey.49 Third, the September 2006 thesis 
by Linda Scott looks at the private partnerships instrumental during Hurricane Katrina 
                                                 
44 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP),” (n.d.), 
http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/planning/hpp/pages/default.aspx. 
45 CDC-RFA-TP12-1201: Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreements (Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and 
Preparedness, 2012). 
46 Donya Currie, “Disaster Response Workforce Could Be Strengthened Through Cooperation,” The 
Nation’s Health 42, no. 3 (April 2012): 16. 
47 Paul Barr, Coming Together: Coalition Offers Cooperative Approach to Disasters, vol. 42 
(Chicago, IL: Crain Communications, Incorporated, 2012), 14. 
48 Christopher Voss, “Connecting Our Nations Crisis Information Management Systems” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/3720. 
49 Maria Doris Alvarez, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Systems” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA456995. 
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and their obstacles to volunteering.50 Fourth, the September 2011 thesis by Jasie K. 
Logsdon focuses on the importance of information sharing among the public health and 
medical community. This thesis provides information that validates the need for a 
strategic communication ESF-8 model not only in Mississippi, but in other states and 
local areas as well.  
An expanded literature review allows for the uncovering of four additional 
references that enhance the vision for this thesis. The commonalities of this area of 
research provide a consensus that strategic communication systems help to improve the 
response during times of disaster.51 An article by Erikson describes the knowledge 
transfer that occurs between preparedness and response. Another commonality is that 
such systems provide for timely information sharing, and that time is of the essence when 
disaster looms. Ritchey’s information further validates the cause of the ESF-8 strategic 
communication model development for Mississippi.52  
An area of disagreement within this topic is the particular type of information that 
should be shared within a systematic model of healthcare strategic communication. For 
primary ESF-8 partners, such as hospitals, patient information might be the necessary 
information, but for the overall ESF-8 partnership, the interest is more general to ESF-8 
situational awareness of the related event. McIlwain and Lassetter’s article provides some 
useful information to describe what can be shared from different entities during a 
disaster.53 The literature review provides an article from the fire service that shows how 
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51 Kerstin Eriksson, “Knowledge Transfer between Preparedness and Emergency Response: A Case 
Study,” Disaster Prevention and Management 18, no. 2 (2009): 162–169. 
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the systems can work together to share information and behaviors, which is useful to 
validate the systematic approach to the model and information sharing that will occur.54 
F. META-LEADERSHIP 
The term meta-leadership arose out of planning efforts that occurred post-911. In 
times of crisis, a person who is a leader of leaders and who mobilizes organizations and 
people to collaborate is considered to be practicing meta-leadership. The literature agrees 
that meta-leadership practice encompasses five dimensions: (1) The person of the meta 
leader, (2) the situation, (3) leading the organizational base, (4) leading up, and (5) 
leading cross-organization connectivity.55 This new area of research is helpful as its very 
definition is consistent with the vision for this thesis. The literature reveals that summits 
were held around the United States in the last several years to promote this theme and its 
intents. A summit sponsored by CDC in 2008 shared the vision that leaders during a 
disaster must collaborate during times of crisis by mobilizing people and organizations.56 
This summit information found in the literature is very useful to validate the development 
of the ESF-8 information sharing and strategic communication model. All the literature 
focuses on these same five areas of meta-leadership practice, whether it was conference 
records or educational seminars. The Harvard School for Public Health sponsored a 
symposium in 2010 on meta-leadership.57 Again, this concept is what the development of 
the ESF-8 strategic communication model is trying to accomplish by integrating efforts 
beyond silo thinking in the area of public health and medical strategic communication. 
Through these integrated efforts that the ESF-8 strategic communication model proposes,  
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public health emergency preparedness can assist in the efforts to connect partners to 
resolve the health challenges the public health and medical community will face during 
any emergency event.58  
A final journal article found in the literature was by Howard Franklin. Its 
relevance to this topic is that great value is placed on collaboration and connectivity, even 
further validating the cause for the development of a model that demonstrates the 
collaboration and connectivity.59 He referred to Barry Commoner’s Law of Ecology that 
states, “everything is connected to everything else” and relates that the need for that same 
law to be the first law of public health. Finally, the most useful and supporting 
information in this topic area is a document by the CDC entitled, “Advancing the 
Nation’s Health: A Guide to Public Health Research Needs, 2006–2015.”60 It validates 
the vision for the MS ESF-8 comprehensive strategic communication model by 
emphasizing and promoting health through strong and active partnerships. It is 
determined through the literature review for this topic area that connectivity and 
collaboration will minimize the chaos of any public health emergency.  
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III. CHINA/SINGAPORE SARS LESSONS LEARNED 




Many historical recordings are available of novel disease outbreaks, epidemics, 
pandemics, and so forth with which that man has attempted to create an atmosphere of 
better health outcomes. Even with today’s technology and organized global attempts at 
preventing the unintended consequences of disease outbreaks and their spread, 
communication with and to the healthcare community is still an issue from the local level 
to the global community. There is still room for improvement and it seems that the globe 
is just one big room.  
The SARS outbreak of 2003 was one such event from which lessons can be 
learned that pertain to communication to the healthcare community. Specifically, 
communication lessons can be learned from China’s and Singapore’s response to the 
SARS outbreak, and thus be, can be applied to creating an effective grassroots state 
public health communications strategy for Mississippi, and ultimately, the entire United 
States. SARS was the first pandemic of the 21st century and was a wake up call for the 
healthcare community!61  
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The SARS outbreak of November of 2002 is thought to have originated in the 
Guangzhou Province of China.62 By the time that the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared it officially contained on July 5, 2003, it had affected millions worldwide.63 The 
final reports reflect that 29 nations were invaded with a morbidity of 8,096 and a 
mortality of 774.64 While these numbers may be less than those associated with annual 
deaths of seasonal influenza, the associated fears, financial impact of the disease, and the 
global involvement of the disease, led to a paralysis of society that has not been seen with 
seasonal influenza.65 In the end, several lessons were learned from this outbreak that can 
be applied to public health emergencies today. It has been well documented that 
suppression of information from the Chinese authorities led to delayed research, and thus, 
policy development that might have prevented the spread of the disease beyond China’s 
borders.66 As a result, many more nations affected were and many more illnesses and 
deaths occurred that could have been prevented if information had not been withheld.67 
Associated with this reality is the fact that this decision by the Chinese authorities to 
withhold information resulted in a sense of mistrust of government and health authorities 
by people around the globe.  
A consequence of this outbreak that affected the world, whether experiencing the 
disease or not, was the economic fallout associated with SARS. A number of studies 
estimate that the global economic impact of SARS was somewhere between $30–$100 
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billion dollars.68 Some countries reported that the health impact created a much higher 
economic shock than was anticipated. These costs were associated with a variety of 
sectors with tourism and travel being the biggest determinants. As a result of this costly 
economic consequence, concern has arisen that a worst-case flu pandemic or some other 
disease outbreak could cause a catastrophic effect to the global economy.69 
The original outbreak in January 2002 was thought to be an atypical pneumonia.70 
Pneumonia was not a reportable disease in China at that time, and therefore, no urgency 
existed to follow-up on this strange illness silently spreading across the land.71 Between 
mid-November and mid-January, the communicable disease had gained momentum and 
had spread from the original city of Foshan to the city of Heyang over 200 miles away.72 
Finally, it reached the capital city of Guangdong. During this time, patients were 
misdiagnosed and no isolation or quarantine measures were in place to prevent further 
spread of the illness.73 Patients were transferred between hospitals, and not only were 
other patients affected, but the healthcare community became involved and grew to be 
part of the larger problem.74 On January 27, 2003, a local CDC notified the Provincial 
Health Bureau, which then notified the Ministry of Health in Beijing. The notification 
was not opened for three days as it was marked “Top Secret” and no top officials were 
available to read the report and analyze the situation.75 When it was finally read on 
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January 31, 2003, a bulletin was sent to area hospitals alerting them of the strange 
pneumonia. Two important issues arose out of this specific action. Many healthcare 
workers were off to celebrate the Chinese New Year and the bulletin did not advise 
regarding the potential for the contagiousness of the illness.76 On February 11, 2003, the 
pneumonia was reported to the WHO after the WHO had picked up on the reports of an 
atypical pneumonia through a reportable system by Hong Kong. On February 19, a WHO 
team was sent to Guangdong but was stopped in Beijing and was not allowed to move 
forward until April 2.77 This action allowed the spread to occur around the world. On 
February 21, a doctor flew to Hong Kong for a wedding party that had just become 
infected. By the end of February, over 900 cases had occurred within the healthcare 
community. On March 12, the WHO issued a global health alert for the first time in 
history, and soon thereafter, on March 15, they issued a recommendation against travel to 
all affected countries.78 During this entire time of disease outbreak in China, the 
government had mandated a news blackout for public information, and during this time 
of late March, it was finally lifted, and the public began to receive information.  
When the WHO team was finally allowed to move forward with its mission of the 
disease investigation, measures of control were beginning to be implemented. On April 3, 
the China CDC issued a bulletin to healthcare workers on how to prevent disease from 
spreading. It was also during this time period that a catastrophic decision occurred when 
the Ministry of Health reported to China’s state council that “SARS was effectively under 
control” and that there were “only 12 cases in the capital city.”79 By April 9, that same 
report had only shown an increase up to 22 cases and four deaths, which was far from the 
truth. By mid-April, a very angry doctor from a Beijing hospital reported to the media 
that over 120 cases could be found at three different military hospitals.80 As a result of 
the ensuing media attention, the Chinese government then fired the Minister of Health 
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and the deputy mayor of Beijing. This pivotal decision saw the Chinese government 
begin to dramatically change its course in the handling of this outbreak, and thankfully 
so. By late April, public panic ensued and millions of workers fled the city out of fear of 
quarantine. Their destination of the rural countryside was the site of a very poor public 
health system that caused the world to be alarmed about the possibility of even further 
poor choices by the Chinese government and poor medical care of the potentially affected 
people.81 By May 20, more than 5,000 cases of SARS had been reported. By August 7, 
the pandemic was declared to be at an end; 8,422 cases with 916 deaths in 30 countries 
and Hong Kong, and 5,327 cases with 349 deaths in China. The fact that 63% of the cases 
occurred in China left the Chinese government to evaluate its outbreak response actions 
taken for this strange disease.  
China did many things considered to be turning points in the outbreak response 
that were noteworthy. First, it misdiagnosed the illness in the early days of the cluster. A 
serious public health lesson to be noted is to never overlook a cluster as all outbreaks 
begin as such. Second, those in authority made a decision to lie about the actual number 
of cases and were eventually terminated as a result of this action. Next, the Chinese 
government refused to let the WHO team into the Guangdong area for several weeks, and 
this time frame clearly identifies the point at which the worldwide spread of the disease 
might have been prevented. Another very poor Chinese decision was the fact that the 
country did not educate or communicate with the healthcare workers. As a result, the 
healthcare workers became a very large sector of the affected population that thus caused 
a crippling effect to the responder community, as well as participated in the global spread 
of the disease.  
Once the Chinese government made a conscientious decision to cooperate with 
WHO, and admit the problem that it faced, it made many good decisions that can be 
documented as worthy lessons learned. The prevention measures initiated eventually 
stopped the spread of SARS. First, it began daily surveillance and reporting processes 
across the country and healthcare community. Second, it began a robust community 
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mitigation education and implementation strategy that included isolation of the ill and 
quarantine up to 12 days for any contacts. Within this sphere of outbreak response, it also 
established fever stations at various sites of large populations. In addition, large public 
gatherings were cancelled and elementary schools were closed. Next, it advertised and 
provided free treatment to all, which was an important decision in light of the poor rural 
area people who often did not seek care because of a lack of money. Another very 
important containment measure was the first responder plans to include infection-control 
guidelines for healthcare workers. Also, China established a SARS National 
Headquarters that became the point of validated information. The Chinese government 
made SARS an infectious disease, and as such, it became reportable. Finally, a SARS 
hospital, Xiaotangshan, was established in a rural county in China.82 Together, these 
several actions saved thousands of lives by controlling, and eventually, stopping the 
spread of SARS.  
China is still today trying to overcome many poor decisions made during the 
initial outbreak of SARS. As it deals with a new strain of influenza, H7N9, the world 
watches to ensure that the many valuable lessons learned are implemented.83 These 
lessons, good and bad, can be used to improve communications during a public health 
crisis around the globe, and especially in the United States today.  
B. SINGAPORE 
Although the actions taken concerning SARS in Singapore were not as numerous 
due to the shorter time span of the outbreak, the actions that were taken were thought to 
be worth noting. Singapore’s response to the SARS outbreak of 2003 was recorded 
historically with many more positive communication efforts and outcomes than that of 
China.84 The WHO recognized this effort, and in 2004, it sought the support of Singapore 
in hosting a meeting to plan the framework for a global consensus based on strategies, 
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effective principles, and the tools for managing outbreak communications.85 Risk 
communication was addressed, and many of the lessons learned from Singapore’s 
response to SARS, were the foundation for the health communication topics. A post-
SARS reflection of those communications in Singapore revealed a city-country quick to 
report its first case. On the very day that a Singaporean doctor was found to have been 
onboard an aircraft and was diagnosed, the Singaporean authorities contacted the WHO 
and an emergency travel advisory was put into place.86 The protection of public health 
overrode the potential negative impact. This transparency carried a powerful array of 
political and moral associations that have led the world community to associate this level 
of transparency as a lesson to be learned and applied by all. The Singapore Ministry of 
Health (MOH) gathered data and information discussed daily by the Director of Medical 
Services with the healthcare community to include representatives from WHO.87 
Singapore had a SARS-dedicated TV channel to provide information to the public on the 
disease, which proved to be beneficial as it made the most headway towards building the 
confidence of the healthcare community and the public. The dialogue with grassroots 
leaders at that local level did much to promote communication efforts also.88 Ultimately, 
Singapore reinforced the need for timely, accurate, and transparent communication 
during a healthcare crisis. Information sharing proved to be integral in its ability to ensure 
good decision making was based on good information shared throughout the outbreak. 
Singapore’s experience with SARS demonstrated that sharing more information is better 
than sharing less information.89 In the end, it paid off. 
C. FINDINGS 
Several lessons learned from the China and Singapore SARS outbreak can 
provide valuable recommendations. 
                                                 







 Develop communication models that ensure a comprehensive grassroots 
ESF-8 strategic communication process 
The China SARS lessons learned teach that communication to healthcare workers 
is essential. As a result of the lack of communication with this sector early on, the 
healthcare workers became a very large group of the affected ill. It was also through a 
healthcare worker that the disease spread to other countries, and thus, became global. 
China’s decision to have initial health reports classified as “Top Secret” led to multiple 
outcomes of insufficiency. For the appropriate government authorities to read the reports, 
a time delay ensued that created a delay of information reaching the healthcare 
community, which also had the potential for those in authority to make decisions about 
topics on which they were not adequately trained that was later deemed as fragmented 
authoritarianism within the medical community. Accurate and timely information to the 
healthcare community is imperative! Another very valuable lesson deals with the 
grassroots sector of healthcare. Due to fear, many persons ran to the rural areas in which 
grassroots healthcare providers would need to be informed to respond adequately.  
 Provide conference calls daily during responses to gather accurate 
information directly from ESF-8 partners to develop accurate and valuable 
ESF-8 situational awareness. 
During the initial SARS outbreak in China, the Chinese government sought to 
support news media blackouts, which not only prevented the general public from 
receiving information, it also prevented healthcare workers from obtaining general 
information as well. This action created a continued mistrust of government and the 
healthcare community. With today’s 24-hour news cycle and social media, this type of 
action is not only impossible; it is counterproductive to the cause. Contrary to the initial 
decisions made by China, Singapore had a dedicated television channel to ensure 
information was available to all. One of the actions that Canada took was to host daily 
conference calls with the healthcare community. At the time it was determined to host the 
conference calls, the ministry directives had called for a halt to any gatherings of more 
than 15 people. Therefore, the town hall meetings and open forums, which were being 
held to share information with the healthcare staff and public, had to cease. The 
conference calls were a popular alternative. Although the calls did not allow for all 
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healthcare staff participation in an effort to keep the number manageable, the managers 
and chief physicians who participated were charged with pushing the information 
forward. Therefore, one of the communication lessons learned from the SARS outbreak 
in Canada was that hosting daily conference calls to the ESF-8 partnership proved to be 
very valuable.  
 Share ESF-8 situational awareness with all partners daily to provide 
timely, accurate, and transparent information sharing. 
China taught the world that misinformation or concealment of information would 
be judged harshly, while Singapore modeled the positive outcomes associated with 
information shared. The value of timely and accurate information must not be 
understated. The Singapore SARS response taught the importance of factual and timely 
information. Although factual information may not always be positive, it is necessary to 
produce the facts and share them with those making healthcare decisions all across the 
state to also further build trust between levels of government, as well as between the 
public and the healthcare provider.  
 Ensure transparency in public health emergency events by developing an 
information policy.  
The SARS event of 2002 and 2003 provided a lesson learned regarding 
transparency in communication to the healthcare community, as well as the public in 
general. The Chinese government traded off transparency for what it thought could 
sustain economic growth. In the end, it cost China dearly. Even after the Chinese 
government did a turn-around in its response action decisions, the public trust was 
eroded, and much of the world still has not forgotten the poor decisions made. Although 
challenges are often associated with disaster outbreak information related to 
transparency, policies can be developed ahead of time that can alleviate spur of the 
moment decisions during the actual event. WHO produced a planning guide in 2008 
related to this topic entitled WHO’s Outbreak Communication Planning Guide 2008. This 
document can be the basis for the policy in order to provide transparent information, 
which will promote trust, while allowing for risk communication capacity in support of 
the overall emergency management for all phases of the event. In the article 
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“Transparency During Public Health Emergencies: From Rhetoric to Reality,” the 
following chart describes how best to develop a policy by addressing the following three 
questions.90 
  
Figure 2.  Identifying the Appropriate Level of Transparency in a Public Health 
Emergency Information Policy91 
A need exists for clear communication pathways that allow critical public health 
and medical information be provided to the comprehensive public health and medical 
community during an emergency event in Mississippi, in the United States, and around 
the globe. Without clear communication pathways that can support timely and accurate 
information with a general sense of transparency, the potential for negative medical 
outcomes associated with an emergency event can and will occur. One potential negative 
outcome is the lack of trust among the medical community, which can spread to the 
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general public.92 The comparative study of two countries that responded to the outbreak 
of SARS in late 2002 and 2003, China and Singapore, provide excellent strategic 
communication lessons that can be applied in the United States.  
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
“Alone we can do so little. Together we can do so much.”93 
— American author and activist Helen Keller 
To develop a strategic communication model for public health, it is beneficial to 
study the successes of previous strategic communication models. Law enforcement and 
fire are two service professions considered communication success stories within their 
own groups, and thus could, be examples for a public health strategic communication 
model. The city of Boston holds the historical key to the formal development of both of 
these professions. In 1678, the first paid fire department was established in Boston.94 
Then, in 1839, the Boston Police Department became the first full-time police unit in the 
United States.95 Both these professions have improved their strategic communication 
processes through lessons learned over time. While it is beneficial to evaluate these 
lessons from an individual department perspective, it is also important to view them from 
the lenses of the urban versus the rural geographical landscape.  
A. RURAL FIRE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
Houston, MS Fire Service—A Historical Perspective of their Communication 
Processes 
How long has the Houston Fire Service been in operation? Some people in 
Chickasaw County, Mississippi say as long as a bucket of water was available, and men 
and women were willing to help their neighbor in a time of need. Although the bucket of 
water evolved to more useful hoses that could be attached to high-powered water 
hydrants, other changes have occurred as well. The communication and notification 
processes within the department have also seen change over the years. Communication is 
probably the most important component in any emergency and the improvements within 
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the Houston Fire Department have served to save lives and dwellings. Although strategic 
communication can consist of many factors, the first communication of notification of the 
firefighters must occur for other areas of communication to even matter.  
In the early days of the Houston Fire Department, fires were only fought within 
the cities’ boundaries. It was only later that the rural areas of Chickasaw county beyond 
the Houston city limit boundaries established volunteer units in an effort to save 
dwellings, and thus, decrease housing insurance rates across the county.96 The Houston 
MS Fire Department has always been a primarily voluntary service with no more than 
two full-time firemen on duty as late as this writing. The number of volunteers has ranged 
through the years with as few as 10 and as many as 40.97  
The means of notification of a fire has evolved over the years. Some recall that 
many years ago, the First Methodist Church bell was rung to signify several different 
alarms within the city. This bell tolled when someone died, when it was time for church 
services to begin, and even when there was a fire. Later during the 1930s, a siren in front 
of the fire station would sound to alert the volunteers that help was needed. The length 
and number of sirens of the alarm siren sound system was also the communication used 
to direct the firefighters to the fire. One siren sound was the clue to go north, two 
signaled to go east, three to go south, and four to go west. Since the response was only 
within the city limits, the volunteers would utilize the major corridors of Hwy 15 or Hwy 
8 and look to the sky for the smoke signal to guide them to the area of need. Although the 
means of activation changed over the years, the siren remained in working order until the 
April 2011 tornado caused structural damage and it had to be removed.98  
The next means of notification involved the telephone. As described by Robert 
Lamar Goza, the call would come into the fire station and the recorded call was then 
automatically forwarded to six senior volunteers. While the volunteers quickly prepared 
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to respond, the wives of these men would begin the process of contacting the remaining 
volunteers. This coordination was done through the means of a call tree that divided up 
the remaining persons.99 Robert Lamar Goza was one of the six original senior volunteers 
in Houston, and still remains a faithful servant today.  
Growth of the Houston Fire Department meant two full-time firefighters about 
1960. Ed Burgess and Loyce Oswalt rotated the 24-hour shift while also covering the 
police radios at night. During this time period, the full-time person acquired the 
capability to send the recorded message to all the volunteer phone numbers at the same 
time. When the call would come into a volunteers’ home, the ring tone was different from 
the normal ring tone that alerted them to the urgency of the call and the impending 
emergency. The potential for a “busy signal” was not an issue, as the recorded message 
would dial the line until someone answered. From the time period of the recorded 
telephone messages came a time when a recorded message was sent to volunteers’ 
pager.100 The latter is actually the current method of activation although the page now 
comes from the 911 dispatcher.  
Today, the notification system is much more advanced than the toll of the bell so 
many years ago. The 911 system is the central hub for the call that comes in to report a 
fire, as well as the tones that go out to volunteers from the 911 center to alert of the 
impending emergency.101 The tones that go out to the volunteers are heard over a pager. 
Volunteers who have been approved and trained are issued the pagers, which are a part of 
the 911-communication system for the fire department notification. Lead personnel have 
pagers and radios that can then be utilized to transmit specific information. Although 
information can be heard from the radio over the pager, they cannot talk on it.102 Some 
additional communication information related to Houston Fire Department is as follows. 
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 The first person on the scene of the fire is the incident commander until 
that duty is passed onto someone with a higher authority. 
 This current notification system has an advantage as it links into the 
already functional 911 system.  
 Currently approximately 20 volunteers are rostered with 15 actively 
involved in the most recent fire responses.  
 Lessons learned from 911 call centers across the country have shown that 
the success of a response can be tied to the information communicated 
through that first call received, and subsequently, how it is then translated 
to the first responders. It is no different in Houston. 
 Contrary to the early days of fire response, the Houston Fire Department 
now responds to the need for support beyond the Houston city limits. 
Whether it is to other areas of Chickasaw County or beyond the county 
lines, support is offered.103 
The advancements of fire response in this country can be attributed to several 
things, one of which is the volunteer firefighters who give of themselves to help their 
neighbor in times of need. Currently, in the United States, over 75% of fire fighters are 
volunteers.104 These collaborative relationships are a strength when it comes to the 
success of communication and response to the event. The number of volunteers has 
dropped over 10% in the last 20 years.105 This decrease has been associated with 
situations, such as the inability to leave a full-time job on the spur of the moment, stricter 
training requirements, and a very minimal pay.106 Much money allocated to this service 
has allowed for more modern equipment from trucks to radios to turn-out gear, all in an 
effort to increase the odds of saving a structure, and more importantly, to protect the life 
of the responder. Even still, nothing takes the place of human-to-human communication. 
Having a strategic communication model in place allows for accurate and timely 
information. Communication at the grassroots level is the first step to a successful  
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response and that communication must be timely, accurate, and reach the right people. 
These multiple communication changes over time have allowed for faster response times 
and more people to be summoned quicker.  
Public health can learn several lessons from this rural fire service in the area of 
strategic communication. First, initial notification of the event and the information that it 
contains is the single most important driving factor of the response. Second, during an 
emergency, collaborative relationships amongst rural volunteers form the basis of a 
strong communication system. Next, having a strategic communication model in place 
allows for accurate and timely information. Finally, as time and technology advance, so 
should the evaluation of the current model to adjust to more improved strategies.  
B. RURAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Chickasaw County, MS Law Enforcement—A Working Perspective of their 
Communication Processes 
Even though technological advances have revolutionized the law enforcement 
community, the strategic communication processes have remained front and center in 
value and priority.107 Communication across jurisdictions and departments has long been 
an issue for first responders at all levels.108 While communication is the greatest 
component for any public safety operation, it remains a fact that it receives the least 
amount of attention and training.109 The law enforcement community has spent years 
improving technology that today allows for communication that persons in this field 
could not have even been perceived 50 years ago.110 Communication within the law 
enforcement community has seen decades of changes and challenges in regards to 
communication.111 For almost every communication need, technological advancements  
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have occurred. While technology has allowed for these advancements in communication, 
gaps do still exist. It is often said that any remaining gaps are 90% human and only 10% 
technical.112 
Another vital element pertaining to strategic communication for law enforcement 
is the strategic planning process.113 Within the strategic planning processes, it has often 
been emphasized that law enforcement needs to be better informed. Also, it is often 
documented that more timely decisions are also necessary. Therefore, communication 
models must be established at all levels across the law enforcement community for law 
enforcement personnel to receive vital information about decisions to be made in a timely 
manner.114  
Much like rural fire services across America, the need to ensure successful 
notification and strategic communication systems is imperative to the rural law 
enforcement community as well. The methodology for notification in rural Chickasaw 
County, Mississippi is much the same for the law enforcement community as it is for the 
Chickasaw County fire service in that all notification calls for a response originate 
through the 911 system. Next, notification and information sharing occurs through 
narrow-band radios. If an emergency event requires additional resources beyond what is 
available, the senior officer on duty requests that the 911 dispatch notify all credentialed 
personnel to respond. This notification is done via radio contact, as well as via cell phone 
notification for a back-up.115 Currently, this rural law enforcement unit still uses “ten 
codes” but is phasing gradually to common language to meet the law enforcement 
community requirements.  
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Having a clear strategic communication plan the entire first responder community 
understands will save response time, and thus potentially, save lives during an event. The 
major difference between the fire and law enforcement notification in this rural county is 
that the fire one has a progressive tone-out through pagers that goes to all volunteer 
firemen at the same time. As long as the volunteer has the pager on, the notification will 
be successful. Contrarily, the law enforcement notification for multiple call-outs would 
be done by radio and then individual cell phone calls for a back-up if the officer does not 
answer the radio call-out.  
In general, public health can learn lessons from this rural law enforcement unit, as 
well as rural law enforcement in general in regards to a strategic communication model. 
Having a clear strategic communication plan understood by the entire first responder 
community will save response time, and thus, potentially save lives during an event. 
Also, a strategic communication plan will not be an end-all to the need for continued 
evaluation. Just as the rural law enforcers are transitioning to a common language to 
ensure clear communication for the entire first responder community, a public health 
strategic communication model will require a common language to ensure that all 
providers understand the information in the same manner. In addition, the law 
enforcement community, like most all first responders, agrees that seamless and effective 
communications is not easy. Whether in an exercise or an actual event, communication 
remains an area that needs improvement. Although the hardest job may be to ensure 
everyone is reading from the same “human” communications page, it must be the 
priority. These truths were pointed out as a result of 9/11 to Hurricane Katrina, and they 
are still being addressed in responses to disasters today. The success of strategic 
communications across various groups will not be effective unless all parties make a 
commitment for the shared goal.116 A lesson learned, therefore, is that for an ESF-8 
strategic communication model, buy-in from all parties is essential for it to be successful 
overall.  
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C.  URBAN FIRE/LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
California Public Safety Communications Strategic Plan–Milpitas, CA 
Although many of the same communication issues occur within the urban setting 
of law enforcement and fire service as the rural setting, some differences can be found. 
Often times, the urban sector has more funding resources, and thus, more opportunity for 
technological advancement. Still, as has been pointed out, technology alone will not 
ensure a successful strategic communication model, but it does make for more 
opportunity to close gaps within the strategic communication process.117 One finding 
often seen across urban areas is the fact that the general strategic communication plan for 
the first responder community is a combined plan. This collaboration is proof of a 
progressive communication model.  
Collaboration between various departments and agencies across all levels of 
government is imperative to addressing real communication barriers. The reality is that 
many cultural differences exist between different departments, agencies, and levels of 
government.118 Silos are then created that prevent successful strategic communication.119 
This situation is often found to be true from within groups and then beyond its own 
borders. This issue of silos must be addressed and dealt with if a successful strategic 
communication model is to be implemented that crosses these cultural divides. The proof 
of collaboration is the result of addressing communication issues of silos within different 
entities. Thus, what is preventing this collaboration and information sharing? Some say 
the culprit is structural and organizational barriers, organizational inertia, and an array of 
other behavioral and cultural impediments.120  
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In 2010, California released its Public Safety Communications Strategic Plan.121 
This plan was the result of a unified strategy for communications planning effort. It was a 
plan that many felt was long overdue. While California’s public safety agencies operate 
under 14 separate systems, the goal is to function under a centralized oversight. This 
collaboration will allow for a more coordinated plan that might not have otherwise 
happened without a centralized oversight. 122 Currently, even the state’s Highway Patrol 
and California Fire are working towards a collaborative effort under this structure.123 For 
the plan to be successful however, accountability from the oversight coordinator and 
collaboration will have to continue to occur.  
Brian Sturdivant, fire chief from Milpitas, CA, agrees that the fire/law 
enforcement collaboration is a positive move to ensure successful strategic 
communication outcomes for the citizens of California and beyond.124 Milpitas is just 
north of San Jose, CA in Santa Clara County. Sturdivent has seen first hand the value of 
collaboration as first responders seek to enhance their strategic communication processes 
in an area of exploding population trends. To plan, mitigate, and respond to the threats 
seen in today’s climate, the importance of information sharing between multiple partners 
cannot be minimized. The California Public Safety Communications plan is beneficial to 
Sturdivent’s service as a fire chief because of the force multiplier that the collaboration 
allows. It is also just as valuable to someone from the law enforcement and other sectors 
as it seeks to guide the strategic communication necessary during an emergency event.125 
Some of the key success factors of the plan included active and consistent support from 
the executive-level of key agency executives, including the governor’s office, which 
brings an increased level of credibility to the implementers of the plan across the state. 
Also, the leadership of the largest four public safety communication agencies support the 
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system of systems, which will guide the processes of interoperability. A system of 
systems is referencing the fact that the four largest systems come together to 
communicate through a single system, which is very important for the communication 
process. Next, the governor funded the plan and its implementation, which warranted 
additional support from the first responder community.126  
While several lessons can be learned from the urban model that California has 
implemented, one that stands out is the value of collaboration. For an ESF-8 strategic 
communication Model to be developed, implemented, and maintained, collaboration 
among various entities will have to exist. Another key element is the support from the 
governor all the way down to the grassroots level. Finally, the centralized oversight 
provided a coordination level that can be implemented with the MS ESF-8 strategic 
communication model as well. Just as the California plan has several major systems 
coming together to collaborate and communicate, the MS model will be representative of 
the same thing; multiple systems coming together to communicate as one, the MS ESF-8 
system.  
D. FINDINGS 
From the case studies chapter, it is noted that having a clear strategic 
communication plan understood by the first responder, whether law enforcement or fire, 
can mean the difference in an emergency situation. This plan can then be applied to the 
public health and medical community as well. Another key finding was that strategic 
communication is not always easy and it has evolved over the years with the fire and law 
enforcement communities. As a result, lessons can be learned from the historical 
advancements and not be repeated as public health and medical strategic communication 
processes are enhanced.  
                                                 




V. EVENT, EXERCISE AND WORKSHOP 
“We all knew there was just one way to improve our odds for survival: 
train, train, train. Sometimes, if your training is properly intense it will kill 
you. More often—much, much more often—it will save your life.”127 
—Richard Marcinko, 
retired U.S. Navy SEAL Commander 
Communication is very important to the success of a response in real-world 
events. One way to test preparedness for emergencies is through a full-scale exercise. A 
common thread often identified either through exercises or real-world events is that 
communication has continuously been identified as an area for improvement.  
In the years since 9/11, over one trillion dollars has been spent in an effort to 
protect the homeland.128 The Department of the Homeland Security distributes grant 
funds to other departments, states, locals, tribal jurisdictions, and other regional 
authorities in an effort to better protect the homeland for both natural and man-made 
disasters. These dollars are to be used for the preparation, prevention, response, and 
recovery emergency efforts. While equipment purchases have been an important acquired 
asset with grant dollars, the return on the investment of training and exercises has been 
shown to be a very effective use of grants as well.129  
The federal government provides program guidance for exercises that further 
assist in the preparedness and response efforts for U.S. citizens. According to the 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program website,  
exercises play a vital role in national preparedness by enabling whole 
community stakeholders to test and validate plans and capabilities, and 
identify both capability gaps and areas for improvement. A well-designed 
                                                 
127 Thinkexist.com, “Richard Marcinko Quotes,” (n.d.), http://thinkexist.com/quotation/we-all-knew-
there-was-just-one-way-to-improve-our/397095.html. 
128 John Mueller Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security, April 1, 2011.  
129 Department of Homeland Security, “DHS Announces Grant Guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 




exercise provides a low-risk environment to test capabilities, familiarize 
personnel with roles and responsibilities, and foster meaningful interaction 
and communication across organizations. The Homeland Security 
Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) provides a set of guiding 
principles for exercise programs, as well as a common approach to 
planning and conducting individual exercises. This methodology applies 
to exercises in support of all national preparedness mission areas and 
ensures a consistent and interoperable approach to exercise design and 
development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning.130 
The Target Capabilities List (TCL) is the federal guidance document that outlines 
the 37 capabilities used to guide the emergency planning efforts nationally. The TCL 
document provides a capability summary with the definition, preparedness, and 
performance tasks, and measures. Resource elements and identified responsibilities for 
building and maintaining the capability are also provided. It could be asked, “why 
capabilities-based planning?” According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) website, “capabilities provide the means to accomplish a mission and achieve 
desired outcomes by performing critical tasks, under specified conditions, to target levels 
of performance. Capabilities are delivered by appropriate combinations of planning, 
organization, equipment, training, and exercises.”131 This capabilities-based guidance 
provides a more stream-lined approach to an all-hazards planning and response effort and 
offers a measure of evaluation.  
Under the Department of Health and Human Services, $971 million was awarded 
in 2012 to continue improving preparedness and health outcomes for a wide range of 
public health threats. Historically, two major grant opportunities for public health and 
medical systems’ emergency planning have been available. The Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement is a grant that has been 
awarded to Mississippi and other states and territories since 2004.132 Prior to that time, 
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grant opportunities centered around bioterrorism planning that had specific focus areas to 
use as a guide.133 Today’s PHEP grant guidance is centered on 15 capabilities that further 
the ability to respond to any of the 15 national planning scenarios.134  
Another grant within the medical scope of planning is the Hospital Preparedness 
Program (HPP) grant, which is issued through the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
and Response (ASPR). Within this grant, funding can be provided for eight capabilities 
focused on preparedness for healthcare systems, healthcare organizations, and healthcare 
coalitions. Several of these capabilities cross-reference the PHEP capabilities. The year 
2012 was the first year that these grants were awarded jointly in an effort to encourage 
cooperation and coordination of planning between the public health systems and the 
nation’s healthcare systems. Fifteen PHEP capabilities and eight HPP capabilities of are 
now 23 capabilities of PHEP/HPP.  
The population for the states, territories, and specific metropolitan areas 
determines the division of the grant dollars for the capabilities-based planning and 
response that can often be crippling when the minimum requirements for dollars are the 
same across the board for all whether a little or a lot is received.  
The state of Mississippi has 1% of the total population of the United States. 
Therefore, it receives ~ 1% of the total award of the PHEP/HPP grant dollars. The 2012 
MS PHEP award was $6,826,045 and the HPP was $3,555,672.135 Many would see these 
numbers as a minimal amount of dollars to cover such a broad area of emergency 
preparedness and response efforts while others might think differently. From the 
management view, a limited amount of dollars are available to build and sustain a public 
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health emergency preparedness program with the same requirements as all other states 
while receiving a much smaller amount of dollars. Thus, many real-world responses can 
help facilitate the on-going training necessary to sustain a program. Ultimately, when 
cashing in on the investment, whether in everyday response or catastrophic events, it is 
then truly possible to measure the cost of the investment itself.  
Training and exercising has an expensive price tag but it is very necessary to 
maintain a level of preparedness for the state. In addition, it is only one of the multiple 
capabilities that must be budgeted from the grants. Regardless, MSDH and the State of 
Mississippi have made training and exercising a priority element in emergency 
preparedness. 
Not only has the MSDH addressed gaps in preparedness and planning efforts 
through exercises, it has also had its share of real-life events that have provided many 
lessons learned. The FEMA website has a recording of federal disasters declared and 
listed by state.136 The historical federal declarations for Mississippi can be seen in Table 
1, Mississippi Federal Declarations Chart. These multiple declarations validate that 
Mississippi has had a very active disaster and response cycle historically. Even still, it 
was not until after public health emergency preparedness and other grant dollars became 
available that a more robust public health emergency preparedness program in 
Mississippi was developed. MSDH then had the resources to respond better to such real-
life events at the level currently seen. This robust public health emergency preparedness 
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Incident Description Declaration Type 
4101 2/13/2013 Mississippi 




4081 8/29/2012 Mississippi Hurricane Isaac 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3348 8/28/2012 Mississippi Tropical Storm Isaac 
Emergency 
Declaration 
1983 5/11/2011 Mississippi Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3320 5/4/2011 Mississippi Flooding 
Emergency 
Declaration 
1972 4/29/2011 Mississippi 
Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Straight-
line Winds, and Associated Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1916 5/14/2010 Mississippi 




1906 4/29/2010 Mississippi 




1837 5/12/2009 Mississippi 




1794 9/22/2008 Mississippi Hurricane Gustav 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3291 8/30/2008 Mississippi Hurricane Gustav 
Emergency 
Declaration 
1764 5/28/2008 Mississippi Severe Storms and Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1753 5/8/2008 Mississippi Severe Storms and Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1604 8/29/2005 Mississippi Hurricane Katrina 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3213 8/28/2005 Mississippi Hurricane Katrina 
Emergency 
Declaration 
1594 7/10/2005 Mississippi Hurricane Dennis 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1550 9/15/2004 Mississippi Hurricane Ivan 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1470 5/23/2003 Mississippi 




1459 4/24/2003 Mississippi 




1443 11/14/2002 Mississippi Severe Storms and Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1436 10/1/2002 Mississippi Tropical Storm Isidore 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1398 12/7/2001 Mississippi Severe Storms and Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1382 6/21/2001 Mississippi Tropical Storm Allison 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1365 4/17/2001 Mississippi Severe Storms & Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 






Incident Description Declaration Type 
Declaration 
1265 1/25/1999 Mississippi 




1251 10/1/1998 Mississippi Hurricane Georges 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3132 9/28/1998 Mississippi Hurricane Georges 
Emergency 
Declaration 
1178 6/13/1997 Mississippi Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1051 5/12/1995 Mississippi Severe Storm, Tornado, Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
1009 2/18/1994 Mississippi 
Severe Storm, Winter Storm, 
Freezing Rain And Sleet 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
968 11/25/1992 Mississippi 




967 10/17/1992 Mississippi 




939 3/20/1992 Mississippi Severe Storm, Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
906 5/17/1991 Mississippi Flooding, Severe Storm, Tornado 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
895 3/5/1991 Mississippi Flooding, Severe Storm 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
888 1/3/1991 Mississippi Flooding, Severe Storm, Tornado 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
859 2/28/1990 Mississippi Flooding, Severe Storm, Tornado 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
787 3/5/1987 Mississippi Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
741 9/4/1985 Mississippi Hurricane Elena 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
703 4/26/1984 Mississippi Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3087 12/21/1983 Mississippi Severe Storms And Flooding 
Emergency 
Declaration 
683 6/1/1983 Mississippi Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
678 4/16/1983 Mississippi Severe Storms, Flooding, Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3084 4/10/1982 Mississippi Tornados 
Emergency 
Declaration 
618 4/19/1980 Mississippi Storms, Flood, Mudslides, Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
599 9/13/1979 Mississippi Hurricane Frederic 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
577 4/16/1979 Mississippi Storms, Tornadoes, Floods 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3077 4/14/1979 Mississippi Storms, Tornadoes, Floods 
Emergency 
Declaration 








Incident Description Declaration Type 
3032 2/22/1977 Mississippi Drought And Freezing 
Emergency 
Declaration 
499 4/1/1976 Mississippi Severe Storms, Tornadoes, Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3010 4/4/1975 Mississippi Heavy Rains And Flooding 
Emergency 
Declaration 
456 1/30/1975 Mississippi Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
3006 1/18/1975 Mississippi Tornadoes 
Emergency 
Declaration 
430 4/18/1974 Mississippi Heavy Rains, Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
368 3/27/1973 Mississippi Heavy Rains, Tornadoes, Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
318 1/19/1972 Mississippi Heavy Rains, Flooding 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
302 2/22/1971 Mississippi Storms, Tornadoes 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
271 8/18/1969 Mississippi Hurricane Camille 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
210 9/25/1965 Mississippi Hurricane Betsy 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
135 10/10/1962 Mississippi Chlorine Barge Accident 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 
108 2/27/1961 Mississippi Floods 
Major Disaster 
Declaration 




MSDH responded to the multiple disaster responses between 2004 and 2013 with 
logistical supplies and staff resources as noted in Table 2. Anywhere between 10 and 
2,200 employees were activated at any one time to the multiple events. Also, MSDH 
provided staff resources to events in other states, such as the Kentucky ice storm of 2009, 








Table 2.   MS Public Health Emergency Activations 2004–2013 
2004 Tropical Storm Bonnie 
 Hurricane Charley 
 Hurricane Frances 
 Hurricane Ivan 
 Tropical Storm Matthew 
 Chiron Flu Vaccine Shortage/Mass Vaccination  
2005 Tropical Storm Arlene 
 Hurricane Cindy 
 Hurricane Dennis 
 Hurricane Katrina 
(one of the most devastating hurricanes in the history of 
the U.S. and the worst to the state of MS; billions of $ in 
damage) 
 Hurricane Rita 
2006 Tropical Storm Alberto 
2007 Hurricane Humberto 
 Tropical Depression 10 
2008  Tropical Storm Edouard 
 Tropical Storm Fay 
 Hurricane Gustav 
 Emergystat Ambulance Crisis 
2009 2009 H1N1 Swine Flu Pandemic 
 Tropical Storm Claudette 
 Hurricane Ida 
 Jackson Water Crisis 
 Severe Winter Weather 
2010 BP Gulf Coast Oil Spill 
 Jackson Water Crisis 
 Yazoo County Tornado 
2011 MS River Flood Event 
 Yazoo Tornado 
 Smithville Tornado 
2012 Hurricane Isaac 
2013 Hattiesburg Tornado 
 
Ultimately, Mississippi has participated in its share of exercises; both under a 
HSEEP planned format and real-world events. The common thread that has always been 
identified either through the formal AAR process or just through lessons learned 
documentation is that communication has continuously been identified as an area for 
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improvement. It is also through these exercises that MSDH has steadily seen its 
emergency preparedness and response program improve its public health and medical 
emergency preparedness capabilities to serve the 2.9 million citizens of the state better. In 
December 2102, the Trust for America’s Health report card awarded Mississippi one of 
five states that tied for first place in the country meeting eight of 10 public health 
indicators that affected public health emergency preparedness. The four other states were 
Maryland, North Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin.  
While the Mississippi river flood event of 2011 prompted a coordination of the 
ESF-8 partnership information sharing and communication efforts from the state level at 
Governor Haley Barbor’s recommendation, it become a more formalized reality during 
Hurricane Isaac. In the early days of the Hurricane Isaac response, it became apparent 
that there some value could be seen in the ESF-8 coordination and information sharing 
processes developed in 2011. Many medical facilities were even asking why it not 
moving forward. Therefore, it was determined that representatives from MSDH (Tammy 
Chamblee, RN137 and Julia Woods, PhD) would continue the development and 
implementation of a single model from the state to the grass roots level for the 
coordination of information sharing to the ESF-8 community. With the known ESF-8 
partnership, the state level single model of information sharing and strategic 
communication continued and became what is known as the MS ESF-8 MEHC model. It 
is often during events that plans are developed and then further refined. The Hattiesburg 
tornado event of January 2013 helped to drive the development of the MEHC model 
further.  
A. HATTIESBURG TORNADO EVENT—JANUARY 2013 REAL-WORLD 
EVENT  
On Sunday, February 10, 2013, a violent system of storms moved through 
Mississippi and an EF-4 tornado damaged much of Hattiesburg, MS, in Forrest County. 
                                                 
137 Tammy Chamblee, RN, BSN, CHEP of the Mississippi State Department of Health, who is also 
the Chief Nurse at the Office of Emergency Planning & Response, in Jackson, MS and Houston, MS, is 
also the author of this thesis.  
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The University of Southern Mississippi is in Hattiesburg and received its share of 
damage. The counties of Lamar, Marion, Lawrence, and Wayne also had major damage 
because of the tornado. Reports from ESF-8 situational awareness estimated that over 
350 homes were destroyed and over 1,200 damaged. Emergency management, public 
health, and other responding agencies worked to ensure that the citizens of the impacted 
area received the assistance necessary for a speedy recovery. Public health addressed 
many needs, such as environmental and epidemiological issues. Tetanus vaccines were 
administered. Public information was prepared and released to address issues, such as 
carbon monoxide poisoning, snakes, and water. Boil water notices were delivered.  
As a result of years of planned exercises and real-life events, the MSDH public 
health coordination center was quickly activated and a mission assignment to utilize the 
MS ESF-8 healthcare coalition for ESF-8 public health and medical strategic 
communications was issued. This single model shared daily ESF-8 situation reports 
downward to the comprehensive health and medical community, as well as upward to the 
state emergency management agency and the governor. Through daily conference calls 
with the partnership, strategic communication was relayed, situation updates were 
provided by email back to the MEHC leaders, and the analyzed data was then reported to 
the PHCC planning chief daily for ESF-8 situation report. Through process formalization 
and systematic refinement, the model became the means to ensure reliable ESF-8 
situational updates were provided by a valued source up and down the chain. Although it 
was done timely and allowed for the information to reach the comprehensive ESF-8 
grassroots level, clearly lessons were learned and improvements needed to be made.  
1. What Was Done 
Via email, a notice was issued to the partnership of the daily conference call from 
the state PHCC. This daily conference call allowed for communication to all the 
partnership and drove the necessary information needed to develop a situational 
awareness report. The partnership sent in its reports by 2 pm daily for the planning 
section to include in the ESF-8 situation awareness report released for 24-hour shift.  
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2. What Worked Well 
The daily conference call and information sharing allowed any unmet needs to be 
quickly addressed from the command center to the governor’s state EOC. Also, the ESF-
8 situational report developed was then shared with the partnership in a timely manner 
and provided accurate and valued information straight from the Public Health 
Command/Coordination Center (PHCC) on a daily basis. 
3. Shortcomings 
Several things were learned that could further refine this information-sharing 
process among MS ESF-8 partnerships. The primary shortcoming noted was that not all 
partners understand what their role is in ESF-8, and how this model can help them in an 
event. Clearly, more education and training is needed. Also, the plans surrounding this 
model need to become part of the MS ESF-8 plan to become standardized policy.  
The AAR/Improvement Plan for this exercise is available upon request from the 
author of this thesis.  
B.  MAGNOLIA BLOSSOM 2013—FEBRUARY, 2013—A FULL SCALE 
EXERCISE 
Shortly after the February 10 Hattiesburg tornado, an opportunity presented itself 
to test the effectiveness of the ESF-8 information-sharing model utilized during the 
Hattiesburg tornado event. On February 21, 2013, Mississippi began the Magnolia 
Blossom 2013 full-scale exercise. Multiple MSDH departments and multiple MS 
agencies participated in this event that lasted over the course of several days to meet 
several objectives. This state-level exercise was developed to test the Mississippi’s 
Emergency Operations Center Management, Onsite Incident Management, Medical 
Supplies Management and Distribution, Mass Prophylaxis, Medical Surge, Volunteer and 
Donations Management, Weapons of Mass Destruction/Hazardous Material Response 
and Decontamination, and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive 
Detection capabilities. The exercise planning team was comprised of numerous and 
diverse agencies, including MSDH, the South Central Preparedness and Emergency 
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Response Learning Center at the University of Alabama at Birmingham School of Public 
Health, the University of Mississippi Medical Center, and others including the 47th Civil 
Support Team and Keesler Air Force Base. The planning for this exercise began in July 
2012 with the exercise planning team exploring a scenario that could combine multiple 
partners and objectives while testing the many functions in accordance with the grant 
requirements and the Mississippi Multi-Year Training and Exercise Plan. The exercise 
also needed to coordinate with ESF8 response partners to maximize efficiency in the 
planning and exercise conduct. After multiple planning sessions, Magnolia Blossom 2013 
was born, and once again, the value of effective collaboration when financial resources 
are limited was realized.  
The AAR/Improvement Plan for this exercise is available upon request from the 
author of this thesis.  
While the exercise consisted of seven main objectives, one objective was to 
activate federal resources to provide medical supplies, equipment, and prophylaxis in 
accordance with MSDH Functional Annex 6: Strategic National Stockpile Plan, 
Functional Annex 6.01: Jackson Cities Readiness Initiative Plan, and Functional Annex 
6.04: Receipt, Staging, and Storage Site Operations Plan. Although many of the public 
health and medical capabilities were tested, capabilities 8 and 9 were two that were 
exercised as mandated under the CDC division of state and local readiness, division of 
the strategic national stockpile program. The medical countermeasure distribution and 
dispensing composite measure required a full-scale exercise be done at least once during 
the 5-year budget cycle to receive PHEP funding. Mississippi and MSDH chose to 
exercise the medical countermeasure distribution and dispensing processes of the SNS 
during Magnolia Blossom 2013. Mississippi has historically had a very successful SNS 
program and exercising these capabilities was not the first for the state. During Hurricane 
Katrina, Mississippi became the first state to request, receive, and distribute the assets of 
the U.S. national stockpile in the country. 
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The SNS is a federal program that provides critical medical assets to states during 
a national emergency.138 The federal, state and local planning for SNS was initiated in 
1999, and has evolved tremendously since that time to have a broader all-hazards 
approach. The national repository of pharmaceuticals and other medical resources was 
historically developed for the purpose of a biological response capability. Currently 12 
“push-packages” are strategically placed around the country and can be deployed to any 
of the 50 states and 12 territories within a 12-hour period.139 
The MSDH SNS plan establishes a framework for the management of a public 
health emergency that would require the SNS activation.140 In Mississippi, the SNS 
planning is driven by the need for its’ 2.9 million citizens to receive prophylaxis within 
36 hours to ensure a decreased morbidity and mortality associated with a biological 
disease event. Even still, the influence of planning for SNS has been seen in events, such 
as Hurricane Katrina, the 2004–05 influenza vaccine shortage, the 2009 H1N1 response, 
and the set-up of mass dispensing clinics following localized disease outbreaks.  
Although the benefits of the planning efforts have been seen in several places and 
times, Mississippi is the only state to ever request the 12-hour push package, break down 
the assets, and push them to the area of need. Nine hospitals along the Mississippi gulf 
coast were either crippled or destroyed, and in immediate need of medical assets and 
pharmaceuticals following Hurricane Katrina. The decision of Mississippi Governor 
Haley Barbor and Dr. Brian Amy, MSDH state health officer, to request the SNS allowed 
for the provision of continued medical care in a time of disaster. All affected medical 
communities were being challenged to get pharmaceuticals and other life-saving medical 
supplies through traditional means of vendor managed inventory. Through the processes 
of the SNS planning, MSDH realized that medical resources could potentially be 
                                                 
138 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, 
“Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),” (n.d.), http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/stockpile/stockpile.htm.  
139 Ibid. 
140 Mississippi State Department of Health Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response, The MS 
State Department of Health Plan for Receiving, Distribution, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile 
Assets (Jackson, MS: MS State Department of Health Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response, 
December 20, 2012), http://msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/_static/resources/1136.pdf. 
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available within 12 hours, and therefore, made the decision to request the SNS push 
package, which proved to be a life-saving decision. For 17 days, the receiving, staging, 
and storage warehouse, which housed the push-package inventory, was pushing needed 
supplies to the medical community across the state under the direction of the state SNS 
coordinator and staff.  
Following the Hurricane Katrina response, Mississippi worked with the CDC to 
adjust the push package formulary to meet the demands of a more all-hazards response 
versus just a biological. They also provided lessons learned and made recommendations 
based on this one-time real-world response to this medical countermeasure capability. 
This successful SNS push-package deployment allowed Mississippi to “go green,” a term 
that referenced the overall planning and exercising success of the SNS program.141 
Mississippi currently has a score of 100 on its state SNS program, which only further 
validates the success of the collaboration and the commitment of the MSDH, and the 
many other MS agencies and organizations that participate in this program.  
The planning and implementation of the SNS program in Mississippi ultimately 
affects all the ESF-8 community. Therefore, it is of great value to determine a single 
model of ESF-8 information sharing from the state to the grassroots level, and vice versa, 
that could be utilized if the SNS plan is activated.  
In the Magnolia Blossom exercise, a survey was conducted to test the 
effectiveness of the recent Hattiesburg tornado response strategic communication 
information-sharing efforts to ESF8 MEHC primary and support entities. This 2-question 
survey was sent via email to the entire partnership of the MEHC and consisted of the 
following questions. 
 During the recent Hattiesburg tornado event, did you share the daily 
situational reports with your affiliated partners? 
 Do these current communication pathways reflect an improved 
communication strategy from previous events?  
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The results of this survey revealed information that will further guide the policy 
development of this MS ESF-8 information-sharing model. Of the 45 surveys sent out, 
just over half of the surveys were answered with 23 responding. Of the 23 replies, 20 
answered “YES” to the first question. Therefore, of the 45 surveys sent, it can be 
hypothesized that only 20 of 45 groups actually shared the daily ESF-8 situational 
awareness report down to the grassroots level, which would be a conservative estimate. 
For the second question, 20 answered “YES” that these current communication pathways 
reflect an improved communication strategy from previous events. Even with 25 either 
reporting no to this question (3) or not responding at all (22), this number is a very 
favorable percentage to continue building out the model and plan associated with it. 
C.  CDC H7N9 VACCINATION PROVIDER WORKSHOP—JUNE 2013 
On June 21, 2013, the CDC hosted a meeting entitled the CDC Pandemic Vaccine 
Provider Identification and Enrollment Workshop. Approximately 35 people from five 
states and two major cities came together to discuss issues surrounding current lists of 
potential vaccine providers and other H7N9 related issues. Participating were the states of 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York and Tennessee. Chicago and New York 
City represented large cities. The immunization and emergency preparedness groups 
spent the day addressing different strategies as they related to several pandemic influenza 
vaccination scenarios. The focus of this workshop was to follow up on recent surveys 
sent to all 50 states that had identified some specific pandemic preparedness gaps related 
to vaccination. Findings from these survey results of H7N9 assessments note that 
although the capacity to manufacture and distribute as many as 30 million doses of 
vaccine a week may exist, the capacity actually to administer the vaccine through current 
public health and private providers was uncertain. Also, while excellent systems are in 
place for pediatric vaccine providers to be enlisted during a pandemic, the ability to 
readily enlist adult providers is still lacking in most states.142 
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For the purposes of the workshop, most scenarios centered on the time frame of 
60 days from point of vaccine notification to the time of the first vaccinations being 
administered. Therefore, the need to have lists available was identified as a necessary 
pandemic planning component. A readily available list could ensure rapid contact to 
begin detailed planning of vaccination dispensing with the providers. Otherwise, the 
possibility of vaccination administration being delayed once the vaccine is available 
could cause increased mortality and morbidity associated with the pandemic. Adequate 
planning now could save lives then.  
Although the CDC encourages states to address this gap of a readily available 
provider list, the state of Tennessee (TN) made the argument that because lists are almost 
out of date the moment they are created, better value is derived from just in time 
enlistment. Their ability to utilize several different contact methods to enlist potential 
providers included emails to various professional organizations, conference calls with 
hospitals and their association, information disseminated through the TN health alert 
network, as well as through local public health-private provider contacts, postings to the 
TN Department of Health website, press releases and media interviews, and letters mailed 
out to licensed providers using available addresses.143 Even though Tennessee did not 
feel the need to keep an updated list of the potential vaccination providers, a current list 
of whom to and how to contact the different provider groups served as the gap closure for 
them.  
The New York Department of Health and Mental Health (NYDOHMH) countered 
with the value found in its development of a list based on lessons learned from the Chiron 
influenza vaccine shortage of 2004. Although many traditional providers appeared on the 
NY lists, the collaboration with the centers for Medicare and Medicaid to learn which 
providers were actually vaccinating adults was found to be a very important partner in 
formulating an adult provider contact list. By building upon older lists, and then adding  
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new providers to include pharmacy chains, first responders, and others, the NYDOHMH 
saw the number of providers registered to administer the vaccine climb to 3,069 during 
the H1N1 response.144  
Although New York and Tennessee presented their opposing views via power 
points, the author learned as a participant in this workshop through the discussions that 
varying degrees of similarities occurred among the other states and cities. Massachusetts 
and Mississippi had actual provider lists left from the H1N1 response but they needed to 
be updated to ensure current contact status. Most had actual lists of pediatric providers 
utilized on a regular basis through the Vaccine for Children (VFC) program, but these 
lists would represent just a portion of the needed provider contacts. Kentucky was 
represented by newer personnel not present during the H1N1 response to really know and 
understand what actually existed in their state during that time, but they were seeking to 
learn and then implement the best model. Regardless of the differences, a common theme 
that was validated was the need to have quick access to the vaccination providers to save 
time, and thus, decrease the morbidity and mortality associated with a worse case 
scenario pandemic.  
This workshop also further validated the need for a model to communicate rapidly 
with the comprehensive ESF-8 partnership. Whether the hazard is an earthquake or a 
pandemic, the ability to communicate comprehensively from the state to the grassroots 
level is more necessary today than it ever has been. By having the capability to 
communicate with the entire ESF-8 partnership, the state has the ability to reach any one 
or all the partners needed based upon the event. By utilizing this comprehensive ESF-8 
model, the immunization and emergency preparedness groups could reach out to the 
ESF-8 state lead to then reach down to the facilities, organizations, and associations that 
could potentially be vaccine providers. They, in turn, could rapidly communicate down to 
the grassroots level to share information regarding the need for assistance to administer 
pandemic influenza vaccine to the populous; all done in a timely, accurate, and 
transparent method by a valued source of information.  
                                                 




Not only has the MSDH addressed gaps in preparedness and planning efforts 
through exercises, it has also responded in many real-life events that have provided 
multiple lessons learned. Through these lessons learned, a comprehensive ESF-8 strategic 
communication model can be developed to assist in closing gaps of communication and 
information sharing for future events. In addition, the need for a model to communicate 
rapidly with the comprehensive ESF-8 partnership could be a benefit in pandemic 
vaccination situations as was learned through the CDC workshop. 
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VI. DEFINING THE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION 
PARTNERS FOR MS 
“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed people can 
change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”145 
—Margaret Meade 
American cultural anthropologist 
From case studies of fire and law enforcement to lessons learned from events, 
exercises, and workshops, the definition of the ESF-8 strategic communication partners 
for Mississippi is being refined. In addition, MS medical community partners provided 
further definition to the partnership. On December 5, 2012, a potential group of MS ESF-
8 partners met to discuss the “what, who, and why” concerning a comprehensive ESF-8 
model. The meeting was attended by representation of all primary and support partners of 
the comprehensive emergency management ESF-8 plan, as well as several other partners 
with a vested interest in ESF-8. During the meeting, a draft of the potential model 
partners was shared. From this draft, a gap analysis was done and determinations were 
made to add groups that had not previously been considered. At the outcome, the 
consensus of the group was that the partnership was now a comprehensive ESF-8 group 
from the state to the grassroots level. It was also determined that while this group could 
now be formalized for information-sharing purposes, it would also practice under the 
vision of being the state-level healthcare coalition for Mississippi.  
Prior to the December 5, 2012 meeting, the MSDH sponsored a series of 
questions to determine the baseline needs for planning. (Q1) Has the communication 
among ESF-8 partners improved since Hurricane Katrina? Overwhelmingly, the group 
felt that communications had improved. (Q2) For a response event that occurred within 
the last three years in Mississippi, was your facility contacted more than once daily for 
the same information? While about one-third of the group said that they were not 
contacted twice, patterns were detected as to any particular groups in which this contact 
                                                 




occurred. (Q3) Do you see a need to streamline the ESF-8 communications among all 
healthcare entities in MS? Again, overwhelmingly, the consensus was yes that 
streamlined communication needed to happen. (Q4) Do you desire information pertaining 
to the MS healthcare picture (situational awareness) during an emergency event? Yet 
again, overwhelmingly, the consensus was yes. MSDH took the information acquired to 
use as the baseline to continue to develop a model of information sharing.  
A. WHAT 
To be able to have a comprehensive model of ESF-8 partnerships for information 
sharing, it is important to evaluate what types of groups would need to be a part of the 
model. Some groups play a primary role in the public health and medical aspects of an all 
hazards event, and then others play a supporting role. Ultimately, however, it can be 
anyone who has a stake in the health outcomes of the citizens of Mississippi when any 
type of an emergency that could potentially alter the landscape of the healthcare picture 
occurs. Therefore, what would comprise a group on the model? The healthcare facility 
group of hospitals would automatically be considered because they are pivotal to medical 
care at the grassroots level. However, who else would need to be included to be a part of 
a comprehensive ESF-8 model? Many should be considered. 
B. WHO 
Any emergency event is a local response, regardless of the geographical area of 
the actual event. The locals are responsible for the care of its citizenry, and should 
therefore, have access to any ESF-8 information that can help to guide the overall 
decision making for the response. To build a comprehensive ESF-8 strategic 
communication/information sharing model from the state to the grassroots level, it is 
important to think about who the conduits are to the grassroots partnership from the state 
level. For instance, the MS Hospital Association (MHA) is a conduit of information from 
the state level to the 121 hospitals in Mississippi with a few exceptions. One exception 
would be the MS Department of Corrections Medical/Dental Facility in Parchman, MS, 
which is the state prison hospital. Another exception would be the military hospital, 
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Keesler Airforce Base Medical Center in Biloxi, MS. Finally, the VA Medical Center 
would be the 3rd hospital that does not have an information-sharing link from the MHA. 
Therefore, to develop a hospital branch within the model, four links would be needed to 
reach every hospital and its staff down to the grassroots level. Although three additional 
and individual outreaches from the state-level to the grassroots within the hospital group 
are necessary, great value was seen in identifying the partner of the MHA that was 
ultimately a conduit to reach 121 hospitals at the grassroots level.  
C. WHY 
Who should be considered when determining the healthcare facility types in ESF-
8 in Mississippi? According to the Governor’s CEMP, a defined list of potential ESF-8 
players includes more than just hospitals. Some examples of other potential partners 
include dialysis, pharmacist, dentists, and the military. The goal of a model to show the 
connectivity of all of the potential partners to the healthcare system and a means to 
receive ESF-8 communications would answer many questions, such as from where they 
receive healthcare information and why they need to be included. Each group represented 
needs to understand what it can bring to the table for emergency planning and response to 
respond better as a state during an emergency. A comprehensive ESF-8 group would 
reflect an entire representation of the potential primary and support entities of the public 
health and medical community whether at the local, regional, or state level. While it is 
very important to share information with hospitals, it is also important to include all other 
partners, such as pharmacists, dentists, doctors, nurses, veterinarians, morticians, mental 
health providers, dialysis partners, and so forth. During the MS river flood event of 2011, 
the comprehensive ESF-8 picture included any potential medical person or clinic, as well 
as anyone affiliated with a support role under the MS CEMP ESF-8 support role plan. 
Another important consideration for Mississippi in the comprehensiveness of the 
model is the overall health status of the state’s citizens. According to America’s Health 
Rankings-2012 Edition, Mississippi ranks 49th out of the 50 states in its health 
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outcomes.146 The struggle against chronic illnesses and other diseases remains a 
challenge for Mississippi. Therefore, it further validates the claim that all potential 
partners not only have a seat at the ESF-8 table in Mississippi, but they should have their 
seat occupied for every potential emergency event. Finally, while some partners are 
included because of the general resources that they can provide to the overall public 
health and medical community, many are identified because of their general 
vulnerabilities.  
See Table 3 for the what, who, and why in regards to the partnership of MS ESF-
8.  
 
                                                 









Why important to ESF-8 Communication 
(WHY) 
Hospitals MS Hospital Association (MHA) 
VA Hospitals & Clinics 
Military Hospital 
MS Dept. of Corrections 
Under PHEP Capability 10, Medical Surge, hospitals will provide primary 
health care to the ill and injured. On a daily basis, there are 123 hospitals 
in MS with over 16,000 beds. The MHA has an email distribution list of 
most hospitals in the state. The Veterans Hospital of Jackson is a hospital 
that services the veteran population of the state. Keesler Airforce Base 
Hospital of Biloxi MS services the military installation. The MS Dept. of 
Corrections Hospital is a hospital on the state prison grounds in 
Parchman, MS that services the state prison population.  
http://www.mhanet.org/ 
Long-term Care MS Healthcare Assn (MSHCA) 
Independent Nursing Home Assn. 
(INHA) 




MS Assn for Assisted Living 
Facilities Assn. (ALFA) 




MS Assn for Home Care  There are 57 licensed Home Health agencies in MS with a total of 136 
branches. While there is an association for this group of healthcare 
facilities, the MSDH Bureau of Licensure is also a conduit of information. 
http://www.msdh.state.ms.us/msdhsite/_static/resources/451.pdf 
Dialysis Network-8 MS has over 6300 patients that receive regular dialysis care at 78 
facilities. Network-8 is the conduit to each of the facilities. Without 
dialysis, these patients quickly spiral downward and become part of the 
larger critical medical care for the state. Within the Governor’s 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the Network-8 
Incorporated is listed as a support agency.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealt 
handMedicalServices.pdf 
Hospice La-MS Hospice & Palliative Care 
Organization (LMHPCO) 
MS through various hospice organizations service an estimated 3500 







Why important to ESF-8 Communication 
(WHY) 
Hospice & Palliative Care Organization is the conduit to these providers 
and are a stakeholder to ESF-8 information. 
Health Care Facility 
gaps 
MSDH Bureau of Health 
Facilities Licensure and 
Certification 
Under the MS Board of Health, MSDH Bureau of Health Facilities 
Licensure and Certification is mandated to license healthcare facilities. 
Many of those facilities are reached through conduits of their respective 
professional affiliations such as the MS Healthcare Association and the 
Independent Nursing Home Association for long-term care facilities. Still, 
there are some that could potentially not be associated with an affiliation 
and the MSDH Bureau of Licensure would be the conduit for those.  
MS State Dept. of 
Health 
Office of State Health Officer 
Office of Communicable Diseases 
Office of Field Services 
Office of Health Services 
Office of Health Protection 
Public Health Lab 
The MSDH is a centralized public health agency that has nine public 
health districts across the state that service 102 clinics. Through multiple 
programs, many citizens of MS receive medical support. The 2012 
Annual Report indicates that there were 404,876 unduplicated patients 
served by the MSDH.  
http://msdh.ms.gov/msdhsite/_static/resources/5123.pdf 
Of the 2.9 million citizens in MS, ~ 14% utilized MSDH services.  
Pharmacists MS State Board of Pharmacy 
(BOP) 
MS Pharmacists Assn. (MPhA) 
MS currently has over 5000 licensed pharmacists who provide a service to 
thousands of MS residents.  
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Board of Pharmacy is listed as a support agency.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf 
Nurses MS Board of Nursing 
MS Nurses Association 
There are almost 60,000 nurses in the state of MS who practice in various 
healthcare service fields. 
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Board of Nursing is listed as a support agency.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf 
Physicians MS Board of Medical Licensure 
MS Medical Association 
There are ~ 9600 physicians licensed in the state of MS that have the 
primary responsibility for medical care of patients. Within the Governor’s 







Why important to ESF-8 Communication 
(WHY) 




Dentists MS Dental Association 
MS State Board of Dentistry 





MS Primary Health care 
Association (MPHCA) 
In MS, there are 21 Community Health Centers with 140 full time service 
delivery sites. Also, there are 39 part-time sites that could be either 
seasonal or mobile clinics. The 2012 data reveals that 303,079 persons 
were seen in MS Community Health Centers. Of the 2.9 million citizens, 




MS Dept. of Vocational 
Rehabilitation 
There are 32 rehabilitation healthcare facilities within MS.  
http://www.msdh.state.ms.us/msdhsite/_static/resources/451.pdf 
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency management Plan, the 
Office of the State Medical Examiner is listed as a support agency. 
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf 
Food Safety MS Department of Agriculture 
and Commerce/Bureau of Plant 
Industry/Agricultural Theft and 
Consumer Protection  
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency management Plan, the 
MS Department of Agriculture and Commerce/Bureau of Plant 




This agency has a stakeholder interest in ESF-8 because of the potential 
risks associated with food and diseases.  
Animal Health MS Board of Animal Health 
MS Veterinarian Medical 
Association 
Under the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Board of Animal Health is the lead agency for sheltering requirements 
for pet and animal care. The MS Veterinarian Medical Association also is 







Why important to ESF-8 Communication 
(WHY) 
zoonotic diseases with a membership of around 650. In MS, there are ~ 
1100 licensed veterinarians.  
http://www.mdac.ms.gov/departments/animal_health/index.htm 
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Board of Animal Health and the MS Veterinarian Medical 
Association are listed as a support agencies.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf 
Fatality Management MS Funeral Directors Association 
MS Coroner’s Association 
Office of the State Medical 
Examiner 
MS Funeral Directors and 
Morticians Association, Inc 
MS Mortuary response Team 
(MMRT) 
In disaster events, mass fatality is a capability that has to be planned for. 
There are multiple groups who have the responsibility for care of the 
deceased in either day to day or during a mass fatality situation.  
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
Office of the State Medical Examiner is listed as a support agency.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf  
Medicaid MS Division of Medicaid In MS, 30 regional Medicaid offices serve the citizens of MS. 
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Division of Medicaid is listed as a support agency.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf 
Mental Health MS Dept. of Mental Health There are 15 regional mental health clinics across the state of MS that 
serve the citizens through a multitude of different programs.  
http://www.dmh.state.ms.us/ 
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Department of Mental Health is listed as a support agency. 
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf 
Sanitation MS Dept. of Environmental 
Quality 
The MS Department of Environmental Quality is a stakeholder to ESF-8. 
As the regulator for such things as wastewater, hazardous waste, air, etc. 







Why important to ESF-8 Communication 
(WHY) 
http://www.deq.state.ms.us/MDEQ.nsf/page/Main_Home?OpenDocument 
Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency management Plan, the 





MS Dept. of Human Services Under the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Department of Human Services has the primary responsibility for-
ESF-6, Mass Care Housing and Human Services, in MS. MSDH is a 





MS Institutions of Higher 
Learning 
MS State Board of Community 
and Junior Colleges 
Under the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, 
MSDH has the responsibility for special medical needs sheltering in MS 
under ESF-6. MSDH partners with the community colleges of MS to 
provide the physical locations for special medical needs shelters.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/ESF6MassCareHousingandHumanServices.pdf 
Also, under the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management 
Plan, the MS Institutions of Higher Learning and the MS State Board of 









Why important to ESF-8 Communication 
(WHY) 
Security MS Dept. of Public Safety The MS Department of Public Safety is listed as a support agency in the 
Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan for ESF-8. The 
MS Department of Public Safety has the responsibility for security for the 
Strategic National Stockpile program in MS and thus, is also a stakeholder 




Logistical support MS Military Dept. Within the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, the 
MS Military Department is listed as a support agency.  
http://www.msema.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/ESF8PublicHealth 
andMedicalServices.pdf 
With the ability to provide much logistical support, the MS Military 
Department is a key stakeholder to ESF-8.  
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VII. DEVELOPMENT OF MODEL 
“The whole is greater than the sum of the parts” 
—Author unknown 
 
Every emergency situation presents its own unique challenges. Therefore, it is 
absolutely essential to have a good grasp on the situation to be able to make the best 
decisions possible for response. This clear situational awareness can mean the difference 
in life and death. As the leads for ESF-8 in Mississippi, the MSDH, along with UMMC, 
has a great responsibility to the ESF-8 partners in Mississippi to provide event situational 
awareness to all stakeholders. Situational awareness will allow partners to collect 
information, collaborate, and communicate prior to making these critical decisions during 
emergency events. To have clear situational awareness, strategic communications from 
the state level to the grassroots level must occur in a timely fashion. How can this 
accurate relay of information occur timely by a trusted source? What would an ESF-8 
strategic communication model look like from the state level to the grassroots level? How 
would strategic information be communicated? What type of information would even 
need to be collected?  
A. GAP ANALYSIS 
This thesis addresses a major gap in the literature, as well as the current plans for 
MS ESF-8 public health and medical strategic communication strategies. While the writer 
worked to gain knowledge regarding the topic of a healthcare strategic communication 
model, several different topic areas were researched. Those areas were (1) strategic 
communications, (2) interagency coordination and communication, (3) healthcare 
coalitions, (4) strategic communication systems, (5) organization/ organizational change, 
and (6) META-leadership. The review of the literature determined that a current 
comprehensive state to grassroots ESF-8 information sharing model did not exist in 
Mississippi or any of the other states. In addressing the question, “How can Mississippi 
make its ESF-8-based strategic communications plan more effective and resilient so that it  
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provides accurate, comprehensive, and timely information to more peripheral actors in the 
state’s healthcare community?,” it was determined that a model would have to be 
developed.  
B.  MODEL 
Figure 3 illustrates the concept of a linear communication model. Shannon and 
Weaver created the linear model of communication in 1949. They viewed communication 
as the transfer of information being done by the sender to the receiver. While it is often 
thought that a linear communication model is one-way communication, the fact is that it 
can allow for feedback. The MS model allows for the transfer of information from the top 
down and from the bottom up. The MS Strategic Communication ESF-8 model 
developed for Mississippi as the result of this thesis is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 3.  Linear Communication Model 
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Figure 4.  MEHC Model 
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C. STRATEGY  
1. What Type of Communication? 
Many types of communication must occur during any emergency event. 
Currently, some risk communication plans will guide the information shared with the 
general public through the media. Also, the MSDH shares information through the 
agency website and the Health Alert Network. Then, communication is available to 
ensure that government officials are kept up-to-date as well. Even with all these various 
communication and information sharing plans, specific strategic communication needs 
still need to be addressed for those within the ESF-8 community during an event.  
In the state of Mississippi, the Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency 
Management Plan guides the response for all emergency support functions. Within each 
county of the state, the local Emergency Management Agency (EMA) is the coordinator 
for all events. The multiple emergency support function partners work through their local 
EMA to plan, respond, and make requests up to the state of MS EMA. Under the ESF-8 
group, multiple agencies, organizations, associations, and businesses need coordination 
for the response to any event. The model presented within this thesis allows for the 
coordination of information sharing of strategic communication from the state level to the 
grassroots level. 
In January 2008, the Mississippi State Board of Health enacted a regulation 
requiring licensed hospitals, long-term care, home health, hospice, and personal care 
homes within the state to have an “all-hazards” emergency operations plan (EOP). These 
EOPs comply with standards established by the Mississippi State Department of Health 
and are to be completed and reviewed annually. To assist facilities in complying with this 
regulation, the MSDH has developed five EOP templates that meet the critical elements 
of emergency planning such as communications, resources and assets, safety and 
security, staff responsibilities, utilities and clinical requirements, and support activities.  
The “all hazards” approach to planning and response for events considers 
activities that will occur during each phase of emergency management (preparedness, 
response, recovery, and mitigation). Having this EOP in place improves the capacity of 
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healthcare organizations to prepare for, detect, respond to, recover from and mitigate the 
negative outcomes of multiple potential emergency events. This “all hazards” approach 
allows each facility to respond to a range of emergencies varying in scale, duration, and 
cause that will further allow for the protection of the citizens of Mississippi.  
While not every stakeholder within the ESF-8 community is required to have an 
EOP, currently, over 700 entities are required by the MS Board of Health to do so. 
Therefore, it is easier for all to know the level of expectation of a response within these 
healthcare facilities. Even without being one of the 700+, this level of planning impacts 
all other emergency preparedness efforts in the healthcare community by having a basic 
awareness of planning and response efforts. 
It is apparent that much planning has been done in Mississippi to include the ESF-
8 community. Therefore, it is very important to determine what types of information 
would be necessary to be exchanged between the ESF-8 Public Health 
Command/Coordination Center and the partners across the state. While a primary 
question to consider is “what unmet needs do you have,” the other piece of vital 
information to consider is the status of the reporting entity. Is the reporting entity at status 
quo or is a current response element being enacted according to plans or otherwise that 
would have an impact on the healthcare of Mississippi? Therefore, the type of 
communication most beneficial to this information-sharing model is to determine the 
current situational awareness of the healthcare community and to determine any unmet 
needs.  
2. How Often? 
The timeframe for information sharing through the MS ESF-8 healthcare coalition 
strategic communication model will vary according to the incident and will follow the 
MSDH CONOPS plan for activation. The emergency response mobilization for MSDH 
begins with the identification of a credible threat, which can be determined by law 
enforcement, MEMA, or any other notification of an event of significance. The state 
health officer has the authority to transition from normal operations to a coordinated 
emergency response by the agency, which will occur if an incident has the potential to 
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impact the public’s health or safety or the potential to disrupt the health/medical systems 
of the state. The PHCC can be escalated without a declaration of a state of local 
emergency, will be activated as is appropriate, and will be staffed to the extent and 
duration required.  
The PHCC consists of four levels of operation, and are consistent with the levels 
of activation in the MS CEMP. As the level numbers decrease, the severity of the 
incident increases. Level IV is the day-to-day operations, and typically, has an on-call 
status for after regular business hours. Level III consists of partial activation of the 
necessary support cells to the PHCC at anytime the State Emergency Operations Center 
(SEOC) activates with a potential for the need of ESF-8 support. During this level of 
activation, the command centers are only running on a 12-hour operational cycle. Level II 
consists of a full activation of the MSDH PHCC and runs on a 24-hour basis to support 
the state emergency. Finally, Level I is an expansion as necessary to Level II, and usually 
involves support from outside of the state. It also runs on a 24-hour cycle. While the 
activation of the MS ESF-8 healthcare coalition strategic communication model could 
occur with Level III, it is more likely to be utilized with Level I and II occurrences.  
The PHCC sponsors a consistent meeting and planning schedule published in the 
daily ESF-8 situational awareness report. The cycle supports incorporation of the SEOC 
and governor’s meetings during the response cycle as well. During the operational period, 
the PHCC representative to the MEHC will support a daily conference call at 10:00 am to 
the ESF-8 partners. This will follow the general 9:00 am PHCC update meeting to allow 
for the latest information sharing to include weather briefings. Following the 10:00 am 
conference call, the ESF-8 partners will email their report to the PHCC representative to 
be compiled into a report for the planning chief by 2:00 pm. Then, the daily release of the 
ESF-8 situational awareness report can be further communicated back to the partnership 
across the state via email. For an event that allows for timed planning, such as a 
hurricane, emails will be utilized as the method of communication until a conference call 
is announced. For a 0-hour timed event, the PHCC representative will announce a  
 
 
  83 
conference call by email notification. An on-going consistent conference call phone 
number and time designated for this group will be very beneficial to the consistency of 
the planning and implementation of the model.  
3. Communication Needs 
The information needed to be collected by the PHCC from the various ESF-8 
groups will be determined by the type of ESF-8 group and will vary according to the 
incident. An example of the information needed for a Category 2 hurricane from a long-
term care facility in the direct path of the storm would be as follows: (1) What are your 
unmet needs, (2) Do you have electrical power and at what percent, and (3) Do you have 
food and water for up to 96 hours? Therefore, through the MEHC conference call, the 
representatives to the long-term care facilities would report out on any facilities that had 
unmet needs individually, and also, any general long term care issues.  
For the various groups, information may need to be collected and shared to 
portray the actual situational awareness for that group. One example is the pharmacy 
section. Mississippi has many pharmacists and pharmacies, some of which practice in 
smaller private practice and others who represent large pharmacy chains. Conduits to 
these groups are also available from within the MS Board of Pharmacy, as well as the MS 
Pharmacy Association. During previous responses in Mississippi, the MSDH pharmacy 
representative from the Office of Emergency Preparedness and Response had specific 
tasks. Some are: (1) review information sent by RX Response, a national pharmaceutical 
supply chain monitoring system during emergencies, (2) make contact with Morris and 
Dickson, the state contracted pharmacy wholesaler, to determine any supply issues, (3) 
contact the MS Board of Pharmacy for any dispensing information to be posted on its 
website, and (4) contact MS Pharmacy Association for any issues. This information was 
then shared with the department head. With the model being proposed, the various 
persons and groups would be a part of the information sharing and collection process as a 
standard procedure.  
Another example is the dialysis group. Hurricane Katrina was the benchmark that 
drove the planning within this population due to the life-threatening cause and effect 
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related to no access to care. As has often been shared in this thesis, strategic information 
related to this group would not be public information, and yet, would be very important 
to the overall healthcare response. During the 2011 MS River flood event, the potential 
for displaced dialysis needs for months had the levees actually breeched was a possibility. 
The main questions asked were reported by the Network-8 Dialysis group: (1) Are there 
any clinics within the flood path? (2) Where will those patients receive dialysis and have 
they been contacted? (3) Are there records that need to be relocated in order to continue 
access to care uninterrupted? (4) Is there equipment that needs to be relocated in order to 
prevent a major economical impact to this clinic?  
While every emergency situation will present its own unique challenges, it is 
absolutely essential to have a good grasp on the situation to be able to make the best 
decisions possible for response. This clear situational awareness can mean the difference 
in life and death. The MEHC model allows for the collection of good solid information 
that can then be communicated back to the collaborative group to then allow partners to 
make critical decisions during emergency events. To have clear situational awareness, 
strategic communications from the state level to the grassroots level must occur in a 
timely fashion.  
4. Modes of Communication 
Multiple modes of communication can and will occur during an emergency event, 
many of which will be dependent upon the source of electrical power. The primary mode 
will occur via email and conference calls. Webinar is also an option that will be available 
as is necessary.  
The daily conference call will be an opportunity to provide the latest information 
regarding the event to include a current weather report. After this conference call, the 
email reports from each group back to the PHCC representative will allow for a 
compilation of information to give a timely and accurate situational awareness of ESF-8 
on at least a daily basis. When needed, a webinar can provide for more advanced meeting 
opportunities while being remotely located.  
 The tactical communication challenges faced by all responders during an event 
will face this group as well. While redundancy of tactical communication options will 
need to be explored, the basic tools of email, conference calls, and webinar will be the 
primary modes utilized.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
Mississippi is one of 14 states that functions under the centralized public health 
system. The developed model might be easier to implement in a state with a centralized 
public health agency. Also, information sharing will be dependent upon the multiple 
layers and the buy-in of the many partners. Mississippi (and MSDH) has traditionally 
relied upon its relationships as the key component to the successes of its planning and 
response efforts across multiple jurisdictions, and then, multiple agencies and 
organizations. In areas that do not hold relationship building as a valuable commodity, 
this comprehensive model would be more challenging. In addition, the updating of 
contact information is an on-going challenge that must be regularly addressed to keep 
current data.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 




This thesis developed a communication model currently being implemented in 
Mississippi. All signs seem to indicate that it will be a marked improvement in the 
strategic communication within the comprehensive ESF-8 community of the state. More 
ESF-8 partners and their supporting partnerships of ESF-8 from other emergency support 
function areas are taking their seat at the table than ever have before. As a result, it is felt 
that the outcomes to healthcare during any emergency event will be improved and the 
informed decisions that can be made by the ESF-8 community with ESF-8 situational 
awareness will ultimately improve health and save lives.  
The Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC) was constructed at the 
White House during World War II under President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s leadership.148 
Its original purpose existed to prepare for nuclear contingencies.149 The PEOC was 
constructed below the east wing while the situation room is located in the basement of the 
west wing. The President and his staff would meet with advisors in the situation room to 
discuss a situation, and the PEOC is considered the actual command center where 
strategic communication is disseminated. The military staff the PEOC around the clock 
and it serves two primary purposes, (1) To provide critical people with staff and data 
necessary to render critical decisions, and (2) Ensure the continuity of the facility and 
government to disseminate these decisions.150 Under President Obama’s administration, 
the White House PEOC has undergone upgrades that include a massive communication 
                                                 
147 Quoteswave, “Mark Twain Quotes (Images),” (n.d.), http://www.quoteswave.com/picture-
quotes/372672. 
148 John Pike and Steven Aftergood, “The White House President’s Emergency Operations Center-
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data center to disseminate strategic communication information that is timely and 
accurate to the myriad of partners who will expedite and execute these critical decisions 
during an event.  
From the federal to the state to the local level, strategic communication pathways 
are imperative to the success of response. Public health has a very important role to play 
in homeland security and strategic communication is a vital element within this 
emergency support function. Public health is even considered to be a level 3 tiered 
critical infrastructure component of the United States. 151 The problem is that no strategic 
communication model is available in Mississippi for the comprehensive healthcare 
community (from the local pharmacists to large hospitals) to receive ESF-8 related and 
other types of information from state public health authorities in a timely manner. 
Conversely, the state public health authorities do not have a clear strategy for obtaining 
information from the comprehensive grassroots partnership in a timely manner. The 
Mississippi River Flood Event of 2011 validated this claim that state health authorities 
had limited access to the broad health and medical community. The literature review 
validates that it seems to be a general problem across the country.  
Who should be considered partners in ESF-8 in Mississippi? According to the 
Mississippi Governor’s CEMP, ESF-8 is the emergency support function for public 
health and medical services. It provides the mechanism for coordinated federal assistance 
to supplement state, tribal, and local resources in response to a public health and medical 
disaster, potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response, and/or 
during a developing potential health and medical emergency. Within this ESF-8 plan, a 
defined list of potential ESF-8 players includes more than just hospitals and EMS. Some 
examples of other potential partners include dialysis, pharmacist, dentists, and the 
military. The problem is that it is unclear how, for example, dialysis clinics can receive 
information from public health agencies during a crisis. And if they cannot receive 
accurate, timely, and useful information, they may be at risk of being unable to provide 
their patients with the proper treatments or possibly even be at risk of transmitting some 
                                                 
151 Department of Homeland Security, Healthcare and Public Health Sector, “Sector Overview.” 
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type of serious infection or disease, and thus, becoming a part of the disease vector. 
Although multiple partners are listed in the CEMP, clear communication pathways are 
lacking that allow critical public health and medical information to be provided to the 
comprehensive public health and medical community. To ensure that a comprehensive 
ESF-8 state level healthcare coalition exists, a defined group of partners is necessary that 
is larger than just a traditional hospital and an EMS. Each group represented needs to 
understand what it can bring to the table for emergency planning and response to respond 
better as a state during an emergency. Current federal guidance is suggesting healthcare 
coalitions as a means of organizing these collaborative efforts that can produce an 
outcome of coordinated planning and response to all hazards events that can then also 
create an atmosphere of transparency within a group. The effective comprehensive 
strategic communications model for ESF-8 was able to answer the questions of “what,” 
“who,” and “how.”  
Value Proposition—Many will ask what the value is of a comprehensive ESF-8 
state to grassroots communications model. By utilizing the Blue Ocean Strategy, a value 
proposition can be determined.152 The Blue Ocean Strategy is outside of the box thinking 
and planning for how to do something. Within the Blue Ocean Strategy concept, four 
actions create a framework. By using this framework, it can then be determined within 
the current information sharing structure of ESF-8 what needs to be eliminated, reduced, 
raised, and created as follows. 
 Eliminate 
 Gaps in communication for collaborative ESF-8 partnership 
 Multiple models and lists of ESF-8 partners 
 Raise 
 Value of information shared in terms of usefulness, accuracy, 
timeliness 
 Reduce 
 Risk of miscommunication  
                                                 
152 W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborngne, Blue Ocean Strategy, ed. Harvard Business School 
Publishing Corporation (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2005), 240. 
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 Lack of communication 
 Inability to contact all ESF-8 partnership 
 Create- 
 Timeliness of information 
 Transparency of information 
 Accuracy of information 
 Trust of ESF-8 leadership 
The combination of these changes creates the innovation pathways of 
communication. The following list includes the dimensions of these pathways: 
organizational, human, technical, and political, etc. With the creation of the timeliness of 
information, the transparency of information, and the accuracy of information, it will be a 
natural result to increase the trust of ESF-8 leadership. These four created outcomes will 
increase the value of the coordination of communication within the MS ESF-8 network.  
While value might be thought of in terms of dollars used and saved, value is also 
measured by the overall impact something has on current policy. The state of Mississippi 
has 1% of the total population of the United States. Therefore, it receives approximately 
1% of the total award of the PHEP/HPP grant dollars. As the economic crisis in this 
country continues to drive a decrease in funding for grant opportunities, it remains critical 
to ensure that the value of this communication modeling strategy is cost benefit effective.  
Value can also be related to increased performance. In the response phase of a 
disaster, the timeliness of information can mean the difference in life and death. This 
system is expected to provide factual information, consistently, in a timely fashion, and 
correctly, so that decisions can be made that may ultimately prevent morbidity and 
mortality whether associated with a disease outbreak or incident of man-made cause. This 
transparency will also automatically lead to greater trust of leadership, which helps to 
drive more positive opportunity for refinement of planning and response processes. 
Ultimately, the value is a more prepared medical community.  
Multidisciplinary Perspective on Proposed Changes—Since multiple disciplines 
are associated with the MS ESF-8 network, all partners are not at the same level of 
preparedness and response activity. Williamson Murray, in Military Adaptation in War-
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With Fear of Change, is quoted as saying, “And, The general said, “Stop sending officers 
who understand the system and start sending those who could identify creative solutions 
to unforeseen problems.”153 The beauty of this concept is that when the value of the 
newer associates and the potential that they can bring to the table is recognized, an 
opportunity is presented to problem-solve in areas that might have previously been 
considered untouchable. A down side to the non-traditional and newer partners at the 
table is that an increased need occurs for education regarding the basic emergency 
preparedness concepts. To get all partners to the level of realizing the value of the 
comprehensive strategic communication model will be a challenge but one worth the 
effort.  
These multiple disciplines are both medical and non-medical persons. The 
traditional medical groups are hospitals, long-term care facilities, and emergency medical 
services. Non-traditional medical partners are pharmacists, dentists, dialysis groups, and 
boards or associations of these partners. The non-medical partners would be those groups 
that would have a vested interest in the health and medical responses of the citizens of the 
state which could ultimately be a very large pool of potentials. In Mississippi, some non-
traditional non-medical partners of the ESF-8 family are the MS Department of 
Education, MS Department of Public Safety, MS Department of Human Services, and the 
MS National Guard. Each of these groups brings something to the table that would be 
valuable to the planning, mitigation, response, and recovery of the public health and 
medical issues related to any of the many all-hazards events. 
Problems to Address—While the model itself is designed to create a pathway of 
timely information sharing from the state to the grassroots level and vice versa during an 
all hazards response, the success is only as good as the groups who activate and 
implement the plan. Within any group, the information sharing can be held up if the 
conduit of information stalls the process. Many responses are not considered statewide 
responses even though the state EOC and Public Health Command/Coordination Center 
are operational. Therefore, some state level groups may feel it is not necessary to push 
                                                 
153 Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War-With Fear of Change (Cambridge, NY:Cambidge 
University Press, 2011). 
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information to their constituents at the grassroots level for smaller events. One example 
might be a tornado event that has affected a local area. The ESF-8 information from that 
area might not affect other parts of the state directly, and therefore, the state level partner 
may choose not to disseminate the ESF-8 information to its entire group partnership. 
These issues create challenges for further review. 
Implementation—While the implementation of this model has already begun, its 
success and value is yet to be completely identified, full filled, or completely understood. 
Following the identification of the need for such a comprehensive strategy in 2011, the 
MSDH began the process of coordinating the potential partners within the scope of the 
Governor’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan ESF-8 partnership. The 
Governor also validated the concept after the 2011 MS River Flood Event by advising 
that the group and communication processes continue indefinitely. This group has 
continued to evolve through recommendations of other group members. Through the real-
world event of the Hattiesburg Tornado of January 2013, and the MS Magnolia Blossom 
Full Scale Exercise of February 2013, the information-sharing model has been tested and 
revised. The AARs of each of those events have given clear Improvement Action Plan 
(IAP) items to continue to refine the model.  
Ultimately, the timeliness of information released through the daily situation 
reports for ESF-8, the transparency of information produced, the accuracy of the 
information, and the outcomes related to increased trust of ESF-8 leadership will be the 
factors that will validate any implementation issues that arise. Through the development 
of this model, the author has determined the what, who, and why associated with the MS 
ESF-8 strategic communication model. Finally, and most important, this research is the 
scientific documentation that this model can and will make a difference in the outcomes 
of public health emergency preparedness and response in the state of Mississippi.  
Strategy Canvas—The strategy canvas is one possible way to assess the impact 
(or the potential impact) of the work associated with this thesis. The following graphic 
depicts several different strategic communication thoughts, before and after the 
development of the MS ESF-8 strategic communication model. The bottom line would be 
the representation of the information sharing within the ESF-8 community prior to the 
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development of the state level healthcare coalition commonly known as the MEHC. The 
top line is a portrayal of the information after the development of the MEHC with the 
high/low being the value that can be placed on policy related to MSDH and ESF-8 
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Figure 5.  Strategy Canvas 
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Finally, the development of a comprehensive ESF-8 information-sharing model 
from the state to the grassroots level in Mississippi will have a positive impact on the 
health and medical outcomes of the citizens of the state during an all hazards event. 
These successes could then further impact the public health and medical outcomes of 
citizens all across the country as other states consider the MS model to create their own 
state to grassroots level information sharing model. While multiple pathways for 
information sharing may exist and get the job done on some level for the ESF-8 
community, the research done for this thesis has shown that creating a single model from 
the state to the grassroots level that can be utilized for an all hazards event and is of great 
value.  
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